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LEAD ARTICLE
A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE
OF TAG JURISDICTION:
JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE ZOMBIE METONYMY
ANDREA COLES-BJERRE*
This Article takes an innovative linguistic and cognitive perspective in order
to construct a fresh critique of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior
Court, which famously upholds “tag jurisdiction” based merely on a
defendant’s transient presence in the forum state. Presence in the forum state,
this Article demonstrates, was likely never anything more than a subconscious
cognitive device—a metonymy—for more abstract and fairness-based concepts
like the minimum contacts standard separately developed by the Supreme Court
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. Metonymy is a common and
useful tool that assists people’s thought processes in law as in everyday life, and
judges of an earlier era were justified in using it. But justice demands that law
must mature over time, much like an individual’s own thought processes do,
outgrowing metonymies that have ceased to be useful. Thus, in Burnham,
Justice Scalia should have recognized the cognitive origins of the presence-inforum criterion, instead of complacently accepting the presence-in-forum
criterion as inherently persuasive. This Article poses a radical challenge to
Burnham that goes far beyond policy arguments and into the linguistic roots
of judicial thought. With Justice Gorsuch replacing Justice Scalia on the bench,
will Burnham be buried, or will its outdated metonymic reasoning continue to
lurch zombie-like onward?

* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. For helpful comments
and guidance, I thank Kevin Clermont, Antonio Barcelona, Eric Pederson, and Carl
Bjerre. Thanks also to participants at the Stockholm Metaphor Festival’s workshop on
topics in metonymy, the West Coast Regional Conference on Language and Law, and
the Law and Society Annual Meeting in Honolulu.
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INTRODUCTION
“What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and
obligatory to a people . . . .”
—Friedrich Nietzsche1

This Article brings a powerful new perspective to well-known
doctrinal developments in United States personal jurisdiction law, with
a particular focus on Justice Scalia’s notorious opinion in Burnham v.
Superior Court,2 which famously upholds “tag jurisdiction” against
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in THE PORTABLE
NIETZSCHE 46–47 (Walter Kaufmann ed., trans., 1954) (1873).
2. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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constitutional challenge.3 This Article uses insights from cognitive
linguistics to show that the Burnham opinion is best understood as the
unjustified perpetuation of a metonymy by which a person’s physical
presence in a jurisdiction is used as a convenient, but inexact,
approximation for the person’s contacts with that jurisdiction.
Metonymy is a very pervasive linguistic and cognitive device, used by
all human beings in our daily thinking—including judges. Metonymy
subconsciously affords mental access to one entity or concept, by
means of reference to another entity or concept, with the latter often
being more convenient or easily articulable. To take just one example,
a newscaster might report that “the White House today announced a
new such-and-such policy,” even though the building on Pennsylvania
Avenue obviously did not itself make any announcement at all. The
newscaster’s expression instantiates a PLACE FOR INHABITANTS
metonymy, with the place (the White House) being articulated in
order to signify its inhabitants (the policymakers); or, a CONTROLLED
FOR CONTROLLER metonymy, with the controlled entity (the building)
being articulated in order to signify the controller entity (the
policymakers in the building).4
The metonymy that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion rests on can
conveniently be called PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS. This Article shows that
when PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS was initially developed as a mental
phenomenon by judges of earlier generations, it was perfectly justifiable
and even entirely natural. But by the time of Burnham, intervening social
developments had rendered the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy
outdated, and, rather than perpetuating it, Justice Scalia should have
abandoned it. In particular, the vastly greater ease and frequency of
travel in our modern age has made it much more common for
defendants to be physically present in a jurisdiction without any relevant
contacts. The PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy should, therefore,
have been recognized for what this Article now shows it was, and
subjected to modern due process standards.
It is well established that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion fits poorly
with the Supreme Court’s evolution from a physically-based
jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction—exemplified by the nineteenth

3. Id. at 612, 622 (alluding to “tag jurisdiction” as jurisdiction based on personal
service upon a physically present defendant, regardless of the duration of the defendant’s
presence or whether the cause of action was related to her activities in the state).
4. See Günter Radden & Zoltán Kövecses, Towards a Theory of Metonymy, in 4 METONYMY
IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 39, 40–41 (Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999).
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century landmark case, Pennoyer v. Neff,5 which required service of
process while the defendant is present in the forum state—to the more
abstract and conceptual approach to personal jurisdiction announced
by International Shoe Co. v. Washington.6 This Article analogizes this
doctrinal evolution to a second linguistic and conceptual phenomenon,
namely the maturation of children into adults. Law is a form of what
scholars call “distributed cognition,” enabling the judges of the present
day to learn from the judges of the past, and thus enabling the law itself
to mature over time.7 Researchers in linguistics have shown that
children use metonymies because of their relatively scant vocabularies
and life experience8 and by analogy, the judges of the pre-Pennoyer era
were justified in using presence as a metonymy for contacts. But, under
this same analogy, Justice Scalia should have benefited from the greater
experience of the modern judicial age and freed himself from the no
longer justified PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy.
The point of this Article is not that social evolution has rendered
Scalia’s Burnham opinion unsound as a doctrinal or policy matter.
Rather, the point is linguistic and jurisprudential. Perhaps even the
pre-Pennoyer judges who first developed the service-while-present-inforum-state test, if they had had the historical experience enabling
them to distinguish between presence and effects, would have tended
to formulate their rule in the more supple terms that International Shoe
suggests. The pre-Pennoyer judges would have acknowledged that what
really matters for purposes of personal jurisdiction is the nature and
degree of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and that
jurisdiction based on service within the jurisdiction must accordingly
be limited—just as in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were limited
in Shaffer v. Heitner.9 But, because the pre-Pennoyer judges lacked that
historical experience, they filled the gaps with the PRESENCE FOR
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977).
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. See Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 151 (2012) (explaining that “distributed
cognition” allows groups of individuals to produce knowledge that would be unavailable
to any single individual).
8. Brigitte Nerlich et al., “Mummy, I Like Being a Sandwich”: Metonymy in Language
Acquisition, in 4 METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 361, 362–63 (Klaus-Uwe
Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999) (illustrating how metonymy is an “abbreviation
device” used by children to overextend their vocabulary and by adults for “costeffective communication”).
9. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (holding that in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction must
also be justified by the minimum contacts standard established in International Shoe).
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metonymy. And, in Burnham, Justice Scalia relied on the
same metonymy despite having the greater historical experience that
should have enabled him to see beyond it.10 With the recent turning over
of Justice Scalia’s seat on the Court, it is time to abolish the PRESENCE FOR
CONTACTS metonymy once and for all—but the outlook for this is not
bright, given what we know of Justice Gorsuch’s style of judicial reasoning.
The law of personal jurisdiction is currently undergoing a great deal
of ferment. To name just three significant developments, the Supreme
Court has issued a spate of important opinions on both the general
and the specific aspects of personal jurisdiction;11 scale-tipping
Burnham author Justice Antonin Scalia has died and been replaced on
the bench by Neil Gorsuch;12 and under the auspices of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, the once-dormant
negotiations for a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have gained new life and momentum.13 All of these
developments bring new urgency to the question of Burnham’s
legitimacy. But this Article’s primary purpose is not to argue against
that legitimacy on mere policy grounds; instead, this Article takes a
more archeological approach, exploring the origins of tag jurisdiction
for the sake of the light those origins shed on judicial thinking in
general (and human cognition in general). The result is indeed a new
CONTACTS

10. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617–22 (1990) (plurality opinion).
11. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017) (declining to extend specific jurisdiction to non-residents of California who
suffered the same injuries as California residents); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 135–40 (2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction where the in-state contacts of a
foreign corporation’s U.S. subsidiary were insufficient to render the corporation “at
home in the forum state” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2014) (rejecting
specific jurisdiction after finding that the lower court improperly focused its analysis
on the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs’ connection to the forum rather than
the defendant’s own contacts with the forum); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011) (rejecting general jurisdiction where a
products manufactured by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation “reached the
forum state through the “stream of commerce” and the complaint is unrelated to those
contacts); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (instructing that courts should consider a foreign corporation’s purposeful
contacts with the forum state, not with the United States itself). The bearing of these
cases on this Article is shown infra 124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 220–239 and accompanying text (illustrating why Gorsuch is
likely to perpetuate tag jurisdiction).
13. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L. https://www.hcch.net/en
/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (describing recent
and upcoming negotiations); infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.
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attack on Burnham, but this is a favorable side-effect of an inquiry that
is already jurisprudentially valuable and exciting on its own.
I. BACKGROUND ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is a set of limitations on the power of a court. As the
roots of the word “jurisdiction” suggest, these limitations concern a
court’s power to “say law”—to pronounce an authoritative outcome in
adjudicating a dispute.14 More specifically, “personal jurisdiction” is
the court’s power of “law saying” over the person of the defendant, and
over the defendant’s rights and property, by issuing a legally
enforceable judgment against the defendant.15 The in personam
branch of personal jurisdiction is one subset of a court’s territorial
authority to adjudicate, with another subset being the in rem branch of
personal jurisdiction.16 For clarity of exposition, this Part concentrates
on in personam jurisdiction, as this is the branch of territorial authority
with which Burnham deals.17
When a court has in personam, as opposed to in rem personal
jurisdiction, the court has the power to issue a judgment against the
defendant that can affect any or all of the defendant’s assets.18 The
issuance of a civil judgment against a person is one of the most direct
and dramatic instances, outside of the criminal law context, in which
the power of the state is exercised against a person. An armed officer
of the state will come and seize the assets that the defendant then
owns—land, bank accounts, jewelry—or that the defendant may own in
the future, like future wage payments or inheritances, and keep collecting
these assets until the judgment is satisfied. It is no surprise that this
exercise of governmental authority is controlled, in the United States, by
the Constitution, specifically its Due Process Clause.19 And just as in other
14. See Jurisdiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (showing that
“jurisdiction” derives from the Latin dicere, “to say”).
15. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND
VENUE 7 (1st ed. 1999) (elaborating that an in personam judgment can “diminish[]
the personal rights of a party in favor of another party”).
16. See id. at 7–8. Unlike in rem jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction can result
in the imposition of personal liability or obligation upon the defendant. Id. In rem
jurisdiction is “[t]heoretically and formally” an action against a thing to determine the
interests of persons in that thing. Id. at 8.
17. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607, 609–10 (1990) (plurality opinion).
18. In contrast, a court with in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction generally has power
only over certain of the defendant’s assets. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
19. Where the power of the states rather than the federal government is at issue, as
in most questions of state-court jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause is that of the
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aspects of constitutional law, judges have altered the meaning and
application of this aspect of the Due Process Clause over the decades.
Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that “[t]he foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power.”20 This Article’s concern is not about the
fairness, constitutionality, or other jurisprudential desirability of tag
jurisdiction, as distinct from the soundness, or lack thereof, of the
reasoning in Scalia’s Burnham opinion. Nonetheless, I readily
acknowledge that I am in sympathy with the anti-Holmesian arguments
of Albert Ehrenzweig21 and more recently, Kevin Clermont,22 to the

Fourteenth Amendment: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–19 (2011) (stating
that personal jurisdiction is controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause because exercising jurisdiction “exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power”
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
20. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). A fuller version of the quotation
is interesting as a venerable statement of the basic service-while-in-the-forum rule that
would later be asserted as supporting tag jurisdiction:
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it
is not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun,
and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place
of service upon the person. No doubt there may be some extension of the
means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the
foundation should be borne in mind. Subject to its conception of sovereignty
even the common law required a judgment not to be contrary to natural
justice. And in States bound together by a Constitution and subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny
the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The case involved a defendant who had been
served by publication in the forum state after leaving that forum state with an intent to
establish domicile elsewhere. Id. The opinion holds the service invalid. Id. at 93.
21. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). Ehrenzweig methodically
attacks Holmes’s power principle quoted above, calling it “both factually unsupported
and functionally unsupportable under modern conditions.” Id. at 296.
Apparently unnoticed by Ehrenzweig is that Holmes himself, at the end of the
same paragraph in which he declares the importance of physical power, invokes the “fair
play” that physical power implicates. See supra note 20. When we remember that the
Court in McDonald v. Mabee found jurisdiction not to exist because service by publication
was not sufficient on those facts, the Holmesian declaration emerges as just dictum. It is
easy to make absolutist statements about physical power when no such physical power is
involved in the case. Still less, of course, is McDonald v. Mabee a tag jurisdiction case.
22.
The United States, prompted by the inherent tensions among states in a
federation, early adopted a theory of exclusive power based on territoriality.
The theory originated with the seventeenth-century Dutch theorist Ulric
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effect that personal jurisdiction has always been—and should be—
limited by factors other than the raw power of a sovereign to control
events within its borders. My linguistic or cognitive hypothesis
presumably has the effect of bolstering the descriptive dimension of
Ehrenzweig’s and Clermont’s, and I welcome this fact.
In fact, “power” can be an ambiguous concept, and in law we must
be careful to distinguish its two possible main meanings. In some
contexts, the word “power” refers simply to raw physical ability: an
Olympic weight lifter has the power to lift a 190-kilogram barbell; a
lawfully arrested suspect with training from Houdini may have the
power to escape her handcuffs; and a sovereign has the power to
exercise force over persons within its territory. Judging from Holmes’s
careful reference to “physical power,”23 this first sense is evidently the
one he had in mind (and against which Ehrenzweig and Clermont
clearly argue). But in other contexts, the word “power” may refer to
physical ability as limited or circumscribed by rightfulness.24 For
example a debate about, say, the constitutionality of torture may often
Huber, who contended that each sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of all
other sovereigns' jurisdictions, to bind persons and things present within its
territorial boundaries. However, the principal thrust of the U.S. power theory
was not authorization, not a delineation of the outer bounds of actual
sovereign power. True, courts used the theory to justify nonrecognition of
judgments of foreign courts lacking jurisdiction. More significantly, though,
courts used the theory to impose self-limitation, to specify when the
sovereign should choose not to exercise its actual power. After all, any full
sovereign had the raw power to adjudicate any dispute when and how it
pleased, as well as the power to enforce its adjudication on persons and
things over which it eventually acquired physical power. Yet, sovereigns did
not act this way. Jurisdictional law was a limit on how far the sovereign would
reach to exercise its existing power, a limit imposed not only in the hope that
other sovereigns would restrain themselves similarly, but also increasingly
with the intuition that such restraint was fair. In other words, the power
theory never linked to raw power, but served merely as a metaphorical label
for jurisdictional actualities. Accordingly, power was never the true rationale
of U.S. jurisdiction in any realistic sense. The true rationale was always the
desirable allocation of jurisdictional authority.
See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
89, 99–100 (1999) [hereinafter Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation]; see also CLERMONT,
supra note 15, at 6–7 (“Jurisdictional law was a limit on how far the sovereign would
reach to exercise its existing power, a limit imposed . . . increasingly with the intuition
that such restraint was fair.”).
23. McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added).
24. See Carl S. Bjerre, Mental Capacity as Metaphor, 18 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 101, 116–
18 (2005) (discussing locutions such as “can do” and “can’t do” as expressions of moral
authority that are metaphorical borrowings from the domain of raw physical ability).
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be framed in terms of whether the government “has the power” to
carry out the actions in question, but the substance of that debate is of
course about the rightfulness of the actions—not the government’s
physical ability to carry out those actions. (Everyone grimly concedes
that the government has the personnel and tools and locations needed
to do the job.) Ehrenzweig and Clermont might say, and I would
agree, that power in the first sense is an inadequate basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, while power in the second sense is
simply a convenient label for whatever our legal system determines the
adequate bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be. In this
Article, I will use power in the first sense.
Section I.A examines the earlier vision, exemplified by Pennoyer;
Section I.B explains the later vision, announced by Shaffer; and Section
I.C shows how Burnham presents a conflict between the two visions.
Schematizing greatly for convenience of discussion, the law has
embraced two different visions of the Due Process limitations on
personal jurisdiction: an earlier vision based solely on power, and a
later vision according to which power is tempered by the additional
requirement of reasonableness.
A. Pennoyer and Power as the Sole Criterion
The earlier articulation of the scope of personal jurisdiction comes
from the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff. The case declares that the
constitutional root of personal jurisdiction is the court’s power over
the defendant (or, in the case of actions in rem or quasi in rem, the
court’s power over the defendant’s property), and it treats physical
location as being the determinant of whether that power exists.25 The
basis of power at issue in Pennoyer, and of principal concern in this
Article, is that the defendant must be served with process while present
within the forum state.26

25. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730–31, 733–34 (1878), overruled in part by
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977).
26. Id. at 734–36. There are other bases of power that are beyond the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940) (finding power over a
defendant domiciled in the forum state); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 21 (1890) (finding
power over a defendant who voluntarily appeared in the proceeding); Pennoyer, 95 U.S.
at 735 (noting that a court has power over a defendant who appointed an agent in the
forum for service of process); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction,
and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1382 (2015) (discussing various forms
of implied consent to jurisdiction). Power in an in rem or quasi in rem case based on
the defendant’s property being located in the forum state is discussed infra notes 72–74

10

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

Part of what is confusing about Pennoyer is that it is a case about a
case.27 Case One serves as a kind of prologue, generating the judgment
and other procedural facts that later come to be at issue in Pennoyer
itself, which is Case Two. Correspondingly, Case Two is a collateral
attack on the validity of the judgment in Case One.28
In Case One, an Oregon lawyer, Mitchell, sued his client, Neff, in
Oregon state court for attorney’s fees.29 Neff lived in California and
did not happen to be in Oregon at the time, so Mitchell could not serve
Neff within Oregon’s borders,30 and instead he sued Neff by publishing
the summons in a newspaper as directed by the court.31 Neff did not
respond to the summons, presumably because he was not reading the
Oregon newspapers and so did not know about the summons, and
hence Neff defaulted in the lawsuit, so that Mitchell won a judgment
against him.32 Mitchell turned this judgment into an actual financial
recovery in the same way that winners of judgments often do: he
executed the judgment by having the sheriff seize and sell property

and accompanying text. Jurisdiction limited to persons’ status, for example a declaration
of divorce, is recognized in Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735, and might be analogized to
jurisdiction in rem. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (“A state may exercise jurisdiction to establish or terminate a status if the status
has a sufficient relationship to the state.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state.”).
27. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–20.
28. Id. at 719, 721–22, 736.
29. Id. at 719–20.
30. Id. at 716–20.
31. See id. at 720. The Oregon statute at the time permitted service by publication
on the facts of this case. It provided in pertinent part:
When service of the summons cannot be made [in person within the state],
and the defendant after due diligence cannot be found within the state, and
when that fact appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court or judge
thereof, and it in like manner appears that a cause of action exists against the
defendant . . . such court or judge may grant an order that the service be made
by publication of summons . . . [w]hen the defendant is not a resident of the state but
has property therein, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND OTHER GENERAL STATUTES OF OREGON ENACTED IN 1862,
at 14–15 (1863) (emphasis added) (repealed 1979); see also Pike v. Kennedy, 15 P. 637,
638 (Or. 1887). Neff was not a resident of Oregon but did own property there, namely
the real estate against which Mitchell later had the sheriff execute. Pennoyer, 95 U.S.
at 714. The “court ha[ving] jurisdiction of the subject of the action” presumably refers
to subject-matter rather than territorial jurisdiction, and most state trial courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, so this aspect of the statute was not an issue. Id. at 720.
32. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–20.
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owned by Neff (in this case a tract of land in Oregon).33 Mitchell got
the money from the sale of the land, and a third-party buyer named
Pennoyer got the land.34
In Case Two, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to get the land
back.35 Neff had been given the land by the U.S. government as part
of the government’s efforts to “settle” the West, and the property could
now belong to Pennoyer instead of Neff only if the sheriff’s sale—and
thus the judgment—in Case One was valid. The lower court in Case
Two ruled in Neff’s favor: the judgment in Case One was not valid, for
peripheral reasons that will not detain us here. Pennoyer appealed but
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision on broad
grounds.36 Much of the Supreme Court’s opinion, by Justice Field, is
a hymn in praise of territoriality.37 According to the opinion, the
Oregon court in Case One could not reach Neff in personam because
he had been served outside the state.38 It is “a principle of general, if
not universal, law” that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is
established.”39
Two “well-established principles of public law
respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and
property” are, first, that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory,” and,
second and conversely, that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory.”40
Expressed in this way, the Court’s emphasis on territorial exclusivity
might be seen primarily as a matter of harmonious relations between
the several sovereign states, rather than as a matter of individual rights.
But Justice Field proceeded to bolster his holding with dictum based on
individual rights under the newly-adopted Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process clause.41
33. Id. at 719.
34. Id. at 719–20.
35. Id. at 719.
36. See id. at 732–34.
37. See id. at 720, 723 (explicating the role of territoriality in jurisdictional debates
and applying those principles).
38. Id. at 726, 736.
39. Id. at 720.
40. Id. at 722.
41. Id. at 733. Relying on this dictum, Justice Field declared that the Fourth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that in personam jurisdiction only be
exercised by a competent court and after the defendant is served process within the state
or voluntarily appears. Id. Fifty years later, in Hess v. Pawloski, the Court summarized
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We can say that Pennoyer thus made in-state service of process
constitutionally necessary for in personam jurisdiction (absent the
other bases of jurisdiction). But it is crucial to note that making instate service constitutionally necessary is different from making it
constitutionally sufficient. Service on Neff while he was outside of
Oregon was not enough to support in personam jurisdiction—but
would service on Neff while he was inside Oregon automatically have
been enough? Even if Neff were there only for a short time? Even if
he were just passing through on the way to Seattle? Even if he were
drawn into Oregon more or less against his will, for example by
compelling personal circumstances such as the illness of a close
relative? These sufficiency questions are what the constitutionality of
tag jurisdiction is all about.42 Pennoyer is silent on them, and the
Supreme Court would not rule on these sufficiency questions until
over a century had passed, in Shaffer v. Heitner and the case of central
concern to this Article, Burnham.43
At this point, one should also take note that the in-state service
requirement, whether necessary or sufficient, has a blatantly physical
nature. It centers on the individual defendant’s flesh-and-blood body and
how it relates to a certain geographical boundary at a certain time. The
body is either within the boundary, or it is not. Part II below demonstrates
that physicality of this sort is a very important attribute of metonymy.44

Pennoyer’s teaching as follows: “The process of a court of one State cannot run into
another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him.
Notice sent outside the State to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an
action against him personally for money recovery.” 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927).
42. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611–13 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (noting that most states uphold tag jurisdiction where the defendant was only
briefly in the state, unless the defendant is brought into the forum by fraud or force).
43. On the other hand, during this interim and heightening the importance of
the topic, other courts apparently did treat in-state service of process as being sufficient
for in personam jurisdiction, that is, they did treat tag jurisdiction as being legitimate.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 21. Ehrenzweig writes that before Pennoyer, “[f]orum
conveniens—to use an unusual, but I believe helpful, phrase—was . . . the basis of all
personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 292. He goes on to argue that “only” with Pennoyer:
when transient service [i.e. tag jurisdiction], hitherto a harmless adjunct of
convenient jurisdiction, thus came to be required for the establishment of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, did such service also become
generally sufficient for this purpose . . . . The common law and common sense
jurisdiction of the forum conveniens yielded to a dogmatic rule of personal
service precariously balanced by a doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Id.
44. See infra Part II.
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B. International Shoe, Shaffer,
and Reasonableness as a Separate Criterion
With the arrival and roaring progress of the twentieth century,
dramatic advancements in communication and transportation made it
possible for a defendant to have a significant impact in a state, or on a
plaintiff within that state, without necessarily being physically present
there.45 The defendant’s effects within the state (or “contacts” with the
state)46 readily cross borders even when the defendant herself does
not. In keeping with the purposive nature of judging, the Supreme
Court gradually accommodated these historical developments by
shifting in personam jurisdiction from the single-criterion approach,
just described, to a much more nuanced dual-criterion approach with
which it still struggles today.47 For purposes of this schematized
discussion, one may say that the dual-criterion approach is more
abstract than the single-criterion approach in two ways. First, the dualcriterion approach no longer focuses solely on the simple physical
question of whether the defendant is present in the forum state when
served with process;48 instead, it focuses on all of the contacts between
the defendant and the jurisdiction—whether or not the defendant is
present there at any time.49 And second (and more significant for
purposes of this Article), the dual-criterion approach evaluates those
contacts by a new standard of reasonableness, which is imposed in
addition to the requirement of power.50

45. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (claiming that
conducting business by mail “fundamental[ly] transfor[med]” the national economy
by allowing individuals to engage with parties “separated by the full continent”).
46. The term “contacts” in this context is metaphorical, as opposed to
metonymical. See infra Section II.A.
47. See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 423 (1981) (delineating that, when courts
determine state court jurisdiction, they first “categorize the action” and then “apply
both the power and the reasonableness tests”).
48. Id. (illustrating how International Shoe’s minimum contacts approach has
weakened Pennoyer’s rigid physical-power jurisdictional approach).
49. Id. at 423–24 (explaining that the “metaphorical basis” of purposefullydirected minimum contacts expands the basis of personal jurisdiction beyond physical
presence, domicile, or consent).
50. See id. at 424 (explaining that courts should consider the interests of the
defendant, plaintiff, and forum state to determine whether jurisdiction is reasonable).
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Others have delved into the intermediate evolutionary stages,51 but
for purposes of this discussion, the first important post-Pennoyer point
of reference is International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington. An ambiguity
of International Shoe is resolved by later cases including Shaffer v. Heitner,
which also sets up a striking contrast with Burnham itself.
In International Shoe, a company incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri was conducting its
shoe-selling business in the state of Washington though somewhat
indirectly. The company had no offices or inventory in Washington,
except a single sample shoe of each model.52 However, the company
employed sales persons who lived in Washington to solicit prospective
customers in the state.53 All orders were sent by the customers to the
St. Louis office, and the offers were accepted or rejected there, rather
than in Washington.54 However, sales to Washington customers were
substantial, with commissions to the salespersons being over $31,000
per year (equivalent today to about $420,000 with adjustments for
inflation).55 The state of Washington sought to compel the company to
contribute to the state’s unemployment compensation fund, and the
crucial issue was whether the Washington state courts could
constitutionally render an in personam judgment against the company.56
An individual, having a literally corporeal body, is either present or
not in a forum state at the time of service. By contrast, corporations
and other artificial business entities obviously cannot be analyzed so
literally and simplistically.57 Instead the Court recognized that

51. See, e.g., id. at 414–16; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 569, 573 (1958).
52. Perhaps this is why the company called itself International Shoe, in the
singular, rather than International Shoes.
53. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313–14 (1945).
54. Id. at 314.
55. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
56. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
57. Ten years before International Shoe, the great legal philosopher Felix Cohen
had mockingly skewered Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals for
grappling literalistically with the question, “Where is a corporation?,” and failing to
acknowledge that the question is metaphorical. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809–12 (1935). Cohen equated this
exercise with asking, “How many angels can stand on the point of a needle?,” and used it
as a prime example of what he called “transcendental nonsense.” Id. at 810–11. Cohen has
more to teach us as well, see infra note 210 and accompanying text.

2018]

A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE OF TAG JURISDICTION

15

corporate “presence” is a matter of degree, and that whether a court
declares a corporation to be present within the state depends on
whether the corporation’s contacts with the state are sufficiently
substantial to satisfy due process.58 In a single powerful paragraph, the
Court explicitly rejected Pennoyer’s physical presence requirement and
announced the new standard:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”59

In fact the case that Cohen discusses has a strong family resemblance with
International Shoe itself, involving a Pennsylvania corporation that was held amenable to suit
in a New York court by virtue of its New York activities. Id. at 809–10 (discussing Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (1917)). In that case, Judge Cardozo wrote,
[w]e are to say . . . whether [the corporation’s] business is such that it is here. If
in fact it is here, if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure
of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business is interstate or local,
it is within the jurisdiction of our courts . . . . Unless a foreign corporation is
engaged in business within the state, it is not brought within the state by the
presence of its agents. But there is no precise test of the nature or extent of the
business that must be done. All that is requisite is that enough be done to enable
us to say that the corporation is here. . . . If it is here it may be served.
Tauza, 115 N.E. at 917–18 (citations omitted).
58. The Court wrote:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be
acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its
“presence” without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested
only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for
it. To say that the corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process
requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it
in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms
“present” or “presence” are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17 (citations omitted). Clearly someone on the Court had
been reading his Felix Cohen.
59. Id. at 316 (citations omitted). The capias ad respondendum was an old common
law writ under which the sheriff would physically bring the defendant to the forum to
answer the complaint. As explained in an older version of Black’s Law Dictionary,
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Corporations and their fictional presence aside, this passage clearly
validates in personam jurisdiction over a defendant not served within the
forum, at least under certain circumstances. And its key passage
describing those circumstances, namely the having of certain “minimum
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”60 has remained at
the core of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to the present day.61
Note that this minimum contacts language constitutes a “standard”
as opposed to a “rule.” That is, the minimum contacts standard is
flexible, or malleable, in that it relies heavily on the nuances of
particular facts of a case, and on a given judge’s assessment of how
those facts stack up against the standard.62 In the bulk of its opinion
following the announcement of the minimum contacts standard, the
International Shoe Court imposes a certain amount of structure on
which facts must be considered and how these facts must be assessed,
but this structure does very little to reduce the standard’s flexibility.
The structure amounts only to two dimensions along which the facts
capias was a judicial order “by which actions at law were frequently commenced; and
which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may
have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in the action. It
notifies defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until security for plaintiff’s
claim is furnished.” Capias Ad Respondendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed.
1968); see also Capias Ad Respondendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(current and more concise definition). For the way in which the capias writ fits with
this Article’s main arguments, see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
60. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
61. Moreover, one way of rephrasing this Article’s central thesis, appearing in Part
II, is that this minimum contacts passage also reflects what courts were groping for
before it appeared in International Shoe.
62. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Kennedy explains that standards are flexible, indeterminate,
and administrable only in light of detailed factual contexts. Id. at 1685, 1688.
Accordingly, standards require a judge to exercise discretion in their application.
International Shoe’s minimum contacts standard is a classic example, and other
examples would include a prohibition on driving faster than is safe under the
circumstances, or the “best interests of the child” rule in a child custody dispute. By
contrast, rules are relatively rigid and determinate, and thus are readily administrable
by reference to a limited number of facts, leaving little room for the exercise of discretion
by judges or other law administrators. Id. at 1685. Examples include the sufficiency of
service-while-present rule (i.e., the core of Scalia’s opinion in Burnham), a requirement
to stop at a red traffic light, or a statute of limitations requiring commencement of a tort
lawsuit within one year of the commission of the tort. For a detailed consideration of the
standard versus rule dichotomy in another context, see Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the
Process and Mistrusting the Results: A Structural Perspective on Article 9’s Low-Price Foreclosure
Rule, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 351, 376–80 (2001).
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might be arrayed, namely the level of the contacts and the relatedness
of those contacts to the cause of action.63 A moment’s consideration
makes clear that both of these dimensions are inherently matters of
degree, not matters of kind. Indeed, the Court itself proceeds to stress
the malleable nature of the new test:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation
to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been
suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to
procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little
less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure.64

All of this is in the starkest contrast to Pennoyer’s presence criterion.
The presence criterion is a classic rule rather than a standard because
it poses a black-and-white dichotomy that any given judge is likely to
63. According to the Court:
“Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities
of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or
authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. Conversely
it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent
or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the
corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there . . . . While it has been held, in cases on
which appellant relies, that continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity, there have been instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities . . . . Finally, although the commission of some
single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an
obligation or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon
the state authority to enforce it, other such acts, because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317–18 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 319 (citations omitted). The Court’s reference to “the purpose” of the
due process clause as being ultimately determinative of whether the minimum contacts
standard is satisfied is typical of legal standards generally. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note
62, at 1688 (“The application of a standard requires the judge both to discover the
facts of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social
values embodied in the standard.”).
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resolve with the same hard-and-fast results as any other judge.65 The
Pennoyer question can be answered mechanically, easily, and
predictably. The International Shoe question requires a judge to do the
hard work of, well, judging, and it demands that the legal system be
willing to entrust the judge with the wise exercise of her discretion.
Lucid though it was, International Shoe left unanswered for the time
being two questions that are central to this Article. First, is the
reasonableness standard different from the power standard, or just a
reformulation of it?66 And second, assuming that the two standards are
different, what is the relationship between them: are both necessary,
or is either one on its own sufficient? Answers to both questions
emerged in later cases (notably Shaffer, discussed shortly), but first it
will be useful to further explore the questions themselves.
Today, International Shoe is accepted as standing for the proposition
that personal jurisdiction has two separate requirements: the court’s
power must be measured not only by the older power test (“de facto
power,” as the court refers to Pennoyer in International Shoe’s key
passage),67 but also by a second requirement, newly announced, namely
that it be reasonable for the state to exercise that power
(“reasonableness,” for short).68 But, as Professor Clermont points out,
International Shoe can also be read in an alternative way, under which the
reasonableness standard more or less ousts the power test. Under this
interpretation, reasonableness “reduc[es] the power test to the status of
a rough rule of thumb.”69 Two of International Shoe’s fairly early progeny
followed this interpretation,70 and indeed the famous key passage of
International Shoe itself, quoted above, supports such a reading.71
65. In the simplicity of their criteria, rules tend to resemble metonymies. See infra
notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
66. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (explaining that “[h]istorically the jurisdiction of
courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de factor power over the
defendant’s person,” but not stating whether the new reasonableness standard is a
departure from or an extension of the prior approach).
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. In support of the separateness of the two requirements, see the discussion of
Shaffer, infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text; see also Clermont, supra note 47, at
415–23 (distinguishing the power and reasonableness tests based on Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), and World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in addition to Shaffer).
69. Clermont, supra note 47, at 416.
70. See id. at 417–18 (discussing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950), and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in terms of the reasonableness test).
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. “Historically” a court’s in personam
jurisdiction was grounded on de facto power; hence the defendant’s physical presence
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Turning now to the relationship between the power test and the
reasonableness standard, International Shoe itself already made clear
that the reasonableness standard was sufficient for the court to exercise
power. For example, the Court writes that the “demands” of due
process “may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there.”72 Thus, if the defendant has minimum
contacts with the state that made it reasonable to maintain the suit
there, then the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
without regard to his or her or its actual presence—and similarly
without regard to domicile or consent.73 But, saying that satisfying the
reasonableness test is sufficient does not necessarily answer whether
satisfying the reasonableness test is necessary even when the power test
is also met. To set up a very pointed hypothetical example, suppose that
the defendant satisfies the power test because she was physically present
in the state when served with the summons, but that her contacts with
the state are otherwise so slight as to keep it from being reasonable for
the law to force her to defend a suit there. On facts like this, the suit
may go forward only if we conclude that the reasonableness test is not
necessary but only sufficient. Burnham eventually in fact so holds, but
only in a surprising retrenchment from Shaffer v. Heitner.
Shaffer centers on the wing of Pennoyer’s power test that this Article
has left aside until now, namely in rem and quasi in rem actions, in
which the court’s power is asserted over particular property of the

in the jurisdiction “was prerequisite” to the rendering of an in personam judgment;
“[b]ut now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons
or other form of notice, due process requires only” that there be minimum contacts such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
The opinion’s other references to reasonableness, quoted in infra note 72
immediately below and the accompanying text, are consistent with this reading.
Separate references to a continuing power test are not found here. They are found
elsewhere in the opinion when the court refers, always with scare-quotes, to the
corporation’s “‘presence’” in the state.
72. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. Similarly, after evaluating the shoe company’s contacts
with Washington, the Court concluded that the company’s operations “establish
sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the
state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.” Id. at 320.
73. Id. at 316–17 (“For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state . . . .”).
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defendant, rather than over the defendant him or herself.74 Heitner
was a shareholder of Greyhound Corporation using the procedural
device of a derivative suit to vindicate alleged mismanagement of the
corporation by its officers and directors.75 The suit was filed in
Delaware Chancery Court, though the assertedly wrongful activities in
question had taken place in Oregon and the defendants in question
were not Delaware residents.76 Jurisdiction over twenty-one of the
defendants was asserted on a quasi in rem basis, pursuant to two
Delaware statutes and the fact that the defendants owned Greyhound
shares.77 The first statute, called a sequestration statute, provided that
the court could compel a defendant to appear in the lawsuit by seizing
any of the defendant’s property located in Delaware, holding it for sale
if the plaintiff wins a judgment or if the defendant fails to appear or
otherwise defaults.78 The second statute, which we might call a situs
statute, provided that all stock of corporations organized in Delaware—
as Greyhound was—was deemed to be located in Delaware.79 The state
74. Unlike in personam judgments, in rem judgments and quasi in rem judgments
are limited to rights to particular property. In rem judgments affect the rights of all
persons to the property, good examples being eminent domain proceedings, actions
to quiet title, and partition actions. By contrast, quasi in rem judgments affect only
the rights of particular persons to the property. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 209 (1st ed. 2005); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1070 (4th ed. 2013). For example, in the type of quasi
in rem action involved in Shaffer—sometimes called “attachment jurisdiction”—the
plaintiff has a claim against the defendant that is unrelated to the property; seeks to
apply the property to the satisfaction of the claim; and uses the presence of the
property in the forum as the basis for bringing the defendant into court. 433 U.S. 186,
208–09 (1977). Pennoyer was not a valid in rem case, because the land was seized by
the sheriff at the end of the legal proceedings as part of the execution of the judgment,
and was not attached by the court at the beginning of the legal proceedings. 95 U.S.
714, 720 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977).
75. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189–90.
76. Id. at 189–91.
77. Id. at 190–92.
78. DEL CODE ANN., tit. 10, § 366 (1975); see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190–91 n.4. The
statute required the property owner to make a general appearance in the case in order to
petition the court for a release of the property. Hence the statute appeared, unusually for
a quasi in rem statute, to make no provision for a limited appearance, by which a defendant
can defend his interest in the property without exposing himself to in personam liability.
79. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 169 (1975); see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 (“The stock
was considered to be in Delaware, and so subject to seizure, by virtue of [Delaware
law], which makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware
corporations.”). In reality, the paper certificates representing the defendants’
Greyhound stock might have been physically located anywhere, most likely at their
residences which as noted were outside of Delaware. In more modern times,
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courts below were perfectly happy with this resulting syllogism:
defendants had stock within the forum; therefore, the forum had power
over the property; and, therefore, the forum had quasi in rem
jurisdiction over the defendants.80
The Shaffer Court rejected this syllogism and declared that
International Shoe’s reasonableness standard applies just as squarely to
actions in rem or quasi in rem as it does to actions in personam.81
Adopting a Realist, substance-over-form style of exposition reminiscent
of International Shoe itself, the Court declared that:
“[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” can be as
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage. The
fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but
an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an
ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is
fundamentally unfair to the defendant. We therefore conclude that
all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.82

In other words, if the court is affecting the defendant’s property, then the
court is affecting the defendant him or herself, and before the court can
affect the defendant, it must satisfy the standards of International Shoe.
To conclude this prologue to Burnham, then, the effects on Pennoyer of
the International Shoe-type cases are twofold. First, International Shoe itself
loosens Pennoyer’s physical presence criterion so that it includes other
contacts with the jurisdiction. And second, and more important to this
certificates representing the stock might not exist at all. The certificate’s deemed
location is thus transparently fictional, and Felix Cohen might have had fun with it.
See supra note 57; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Story of Shaffer: Allocating
Jurisdictional Authority Among the States, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 137 & n.6
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (noting the Cohen connection). The Supreme
Court did not dwell on this fact, though one can speculate that the weakness of a
power-based argument based on the stock’s location might have helped the justices in
ruling against Heitner on the reasonableness-based grounds.
80. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev’d sub nom.,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (“[J]urisdiction under § 366 remains, as it was
in 1963, quasi in rem founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior
contact by defendants with this forum.”).
81. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
82. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall wrote for the
majority, and Justices Powell, Stevens and Brennan concurred with all or most of the
majority’s key conclusion extending International Shoe.
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Article, Shaffer shows that International Shoe restricts the exercise of Pennoyer’s
power test so that the court’s exercise of the power must be reasonable.
C. Burnham and the Grotesquerie of Tag Jurisdiction
The judicial grotesquerie of Burnham v. Superior Court arises from the
factually sad but straightforward story of Dennis Burnham and his wife
Francie.83 They were happily—and subsequently unhappily—married
in New Jersey, where they had begun to raise their two children.84 The
couple eventually decided to separate, and Francie moved with the
children across the country to the San Francisco Bay Area.85 Dennis
remained in New Jersey, but when a business trip took him to Southern
California he went up to the Bay Area to visit the children.86 He took the
older child into San Francisco, and when he brought the child back
home, he was greeted by Francie and a summons for a divorce proceeding
she had commenced in California.87 Dennis objected to a California
court having personal jurisdiction over him, a New Jersey resident.88
Schematically, these facts—just like those of Shaffer—pose the
question of whether the minimum contacts test represented by
International Shoe is not only sufficient to support personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident, but also necessary.89 If Dennis’s relationship with
California was insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts standard—
an interesting and potentially difficult question, in light of the
standard’s fact-intensive nature90—then his physical presence in the
forum state at the time he was served with the summons is the only basis
83. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990) (plurality opinion).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 607–08.
86. Id. at 608.
87. Id. If all that were at issue between Dennis and Francie had been the marriage
and divorce, then the only territorial authority that the court would have needed
would have been in rem jurisdiction over this status. See supra note 26. But Francie
was also seeking monetary relief against Dennis, thereby presenting the issue of the
court’s personal jurisdiction.
88. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608.
89. Id. at 610 (“The question we must decide today is whether due process requires
a similar connection between the litigation and the defendant’s contacts with the State
in cases where the defendant is physically present in the State at the time process is served
upon him.”).
90. Justice Brennan’s concurrence holds that Dennis’s relationship with California
did in fact satisfy the minimum contacts standard. Id. at 637–38 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). This, of course, is the reason that the opinion is a concurrence rather than
a dissent. Scalia’s opinion does not reach the question, presumably because it would be
dictum in light of the plurality’s overall reasoning. Id. at 619–20 (plurality opinion).
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on which to uphold personal jurisdiction over him.91 This is
constitutional only if International Shoe’s modern test is simply a matter
of sufficiency, but not of necessity.92
Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion for the splintered bench.93
This opinion upholds tag jurisdiction even in the absence of minimum
contacts.94 Dennis was subject to personal jurisdiction of the California
court based on his physical presence at the time of service alone, even
though his presence was merely transitory.95 (The three days that Dennis
spent in California might just as well have been fifteen minutes, in Scalia’s
view.)96 Stated differently, the opinion holds that International Shoe’s
modern test is only a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction—not a
necessary one.97 Presence in the forum state while being served with
process is held here to remain an independently sufficient basis even after
International Shoe. The structural inconsistency with Shaffer is clear: Shaffer
had imposed a two-criteria structure on personal jurisdiction, at least in
the in rem and quasi in rem cases, and Burnham reverts to a one-criterion
structure. There is also a doctrinal tension with Shaffer, which had stated
that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”98 Justice
Scalia’s ruling does not comport with this statement.99
91. See id. at 619 (plurality opinion) (“The short of the matter is that jurisdiction
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process . . . .”).
92. See id. (explaining that nothing in International Shoe or its progeny suggests that
physical presence within a forum state “is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction”).
93. Scalia was joined for all or most of this opinion by three other Justices:
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and White, with only Justice White departing from this group for
its relatively non-central Parts II.D and III. See id. at 607; see also infra note 99. The
opinion of a competing group of four, with Justice Brennan writing for himself as well
as Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O’Connor. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (Brennan,
J., concurring); see also infra note 104. Justice Stevens wrote alone. See Burnham, 495
U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Overall, Burnham is characterized
by two competing four-Justice opinions.
94. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 623–25.
96. Id. at 625 (objecting to Brennan’s concurrence by supposing that Dennis
enjoyed “not three days’ worth of California’s ‘benefits,’ but 15 minutes’ worth”); see also
id. at 610–11 (describing a view that states have power over a present defendant “no
matter how fleeting his visit”).
97. See id. at 619 (“Nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have followed it . . .
offers support for the . . . proposition . . . that a defendant’s presence in the forum is not
only unnecessary . . . but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.”).
98. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1972) (emphasis added).
99. Justice Scalia anticipates this objection and has a response that is perhaps too
cute for his own good, because it turns out to support this Article’s thesis. In Part II.D of
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Justice Scalia relies on the long history of the service-while-present
rule.100 The relevant part of his opinion opens by declaring that power
over a physically present defendant is “[a]mong the most firmly
the opinion, he asserts that the passage from Shaffer just quoted above must be read in
the two-sentence “context” of its immediately preceding reference to in rem
proceedings. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620–21; supra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing the context to which Scalia appeals). This “context,” plus the “meaning” of
the statement, the “logic” of Shaffer, and what that opinion “was saying, in other words,”
all assertedly prevent Shaffer from being read so broadly as to conflict with Scalia’s
opinion in Burnham. Perhaps so—but if recourse to “context” is to be welcomed, along
with recourse to the asserted “meaning” and the asserted “logic” of opinions, and if we
are invited to express judicial opinions “in other words,” then the field for interpretation
is vastly opened beyond what Scalia’s style of jurisprudence generally sanctioned.
Moreover, there is an important reminder about the common-law method to
be had from the fact that the Shaffer majority was writing the “all assertions” passage of
that opinion by reference only to the in rem and quasi in rem question before it, and
not anticipating the later circumstances of Burnham’s tag jurisdiction question. The
reminder is simply that opinions are written under the circumstances then existing,
with the thoughts and concerns then present to a judge’s mind. The same applies with
full strength to judges of an earlier historical era and thus, the early judges who
embraced the service-while-present rule, with no exception for transient presence, had
no reason to make such an exception because the circumstances under which the
exception would apply were not important to them. See infra Part II.B.3.
Justice White did not join Burnham’s Shaffer-limiting Part II.D, nor did he join
Part III, which rejects the assertion in Brennan’s opinion that due process would require
a full factual analysis of the case’s minimum contacts. Among those who do use Burnham
to limit Shaffer, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had not yet been appointed to the Court at
the time of Shaffer and, as noted above, Justice Rehnquist took no part in Shaffer.
In considering whether the Scalia opinion does in fact comport with Shaffer, it
is also very valuable to consider a passage from International Shoe itself. After setting
forth the matrix of contacts and relatedness, the Court explains that:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which
do not, cannot simply be mechanical or quantitative. . . . Whether due process
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citations omitted). Thus,
Scalia’s reliance on the tradition growing from Pennoyer is in substantial tension with
what the International Shoe Court viewed that tradition as being. “[O]ne would have
thought that tag jurisdiction could not survive after International Shoe replaced
territorial hegemony with a personal jurisdiction inquiry based on reasonable and fair
connection between the defendants, the forum, and the action.” Jeffrey W. Stempel,
The Irrepressible Myth of Burnham and Its Increasing Indefensibility After Goodyear and
Daimler, 15 NEV. L.J. 1203, 1255 (2015).
100. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610.
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established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition.”101
The opinion continues:
The view developed early that each State had the power to hale before
its courts any individual who could be found within its borders, and
that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly
serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter
judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.102

Indeed, Scalia’s argument rests chiefly on his assertion that a rule
supporting tag jurisdiction is long standing, including that it was the
understanding of American courts at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption.103 To this extent, the opinion is an originalist

101. Id.
102. Id. at 610–11 (emphasis added). No great imagination is needed to extend the
Burnham rule to cases in which a defendant is served at a rest stop while cutting
through a corner of the state on a highway, or on an airplane while in the airspace of
the forum state below. “Ladies and gentlemen, if you’ll look out the windows to your
left, you’ll see that we’re now passing over the Grand Canyon and entering the great
state of Arizona, the courts of which you may now be subject to the jurisdiction of.
Welcome to the West.” See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark.
1959) (holding that service made on a defendant while flying in the airspace above the
forum state was sufficient to create personal jurisdiction because the defendant was
“within the ‘territorial limits’ of the State of Arkansas” at the time of service); see also
Stempel, supra note 99, at 1225 (calling Grace “probably the most outlandish example of
the exercise of tag service being used to establish personal jurisdiction notwithstanding
the new jurisdictional paradigm of fairness and reasonable expectation”).
Clearly the Scalia opinion is consonant with what Ehrenzweig, Clermont, and
others have called the power theory of personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text.
In the oral arguments for a recent case involving the
constitutionality of an Arizona statute empowering its state officials to take actions under
federal immigration laws, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), Justice Scalia
posed a question with overtones of Burnham’s power theory: “[I]f, in fact, somebody who
does not belong in this country is in Arizona, Arizona has . . . no power? . . . [W]hat does
sovereignty mean if it does not include the ability to defend your borders?” Transcript
of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
103. As part of his historical argument, Scalia ably argues from the negative:
Most States, moreover, had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from
service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or
fraud, or who were there as a party or witness in unrelated judicial
proceedings. These exceptions obviously rested upon the premise that service
of process conferred jurisdiction.
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 613 (citations omitted). On the force or fraud exception, see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
However, the existence of all of these exceptions also supports this Article’s antiBurnham thesis. Similarly, the four-justice concurrence authored by Brennan
characterizes Scalia’s opinion as relying “solely on historical pedigree.” See Burnham,
495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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one—a mode of judicial reasoning on which cognitive linguistic
analysis can sometimes shed new perspective as shown below.104
Justice Scalia himself nonetheless acknowledges certain authorities that
tend to undermine his historical assertion of the long-standing roots of
tag jurisdiction.105 This assertion was also a matter of contention in the
Burnham opinion itself, including exegesis of quite a volume of old case
law,106 and the subject has continued to be examined since then.107 It is
not this Article’s task to settle that matter, but the historical uncertainty is
itself instructive for purposes that we will revisit below.108
Burnham’s other substantial opinion, written by Justice Brennan, also
upholds the tag jurisdiction rule, so that the issues raised by Scalia’s

104. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. Closing the loop on this aspect of the
Scalia opinion’s reasoning, the assertedly long-standing nature of the service-while-present
rule makes the related Due Process Clause threshold easier to meet. “The distinction
between what is needed to support novel procedures and what is needed to sustain
traditional ones is fundamental . . . . The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.’” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. The contrast that Scalia
draws here with Shaffer’s relatively newfangled and unique sequestration procedure is
implicit here and made explicit later. See id. at 619–23, 622 n.4.
Justice Brennan responds that International Shoe’s reference to “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice” meant simply “that those concepts are
indeed traditional ones,” and did not mean that “their specific content was to be
determined by tradition alone.” Id. at 629 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). That the
syntactic parsing of International Shoe’s crucial phrase is so open to dispute should cause
us all to moderate our confidence in being able to know the thinking process that
underlies judges’ opinions, particularly judges of the distant past. See infra Section III.A.
105. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611 (plurality opinion) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 253–60 (1965), and
Ehrenzweig, supra note 21) (noting that English law antecedents to tag jurisdiction are
not as clear as Justice Story thought).
106. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611–16, 613 n.2, 614 n.3 (listing case precedent in
support of Scalia’s reasoning); id. at 633–35, 633–36 n.8–10 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(listing opposing case law to refute Scalia’s majority opinion). Not cited by the Court
is a scholarly response to Ehrenzweig by Nathan Levy, Jr., which doubted that there is
enough evidence to make an absolute statement on the historical facts of a tag
jurisdiction rule. See Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law
and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 94 (1968).
107. See James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (taking issue with Scalia’s assertion that
transient jurisdiction was prevalent earlier in the nineteenth century).
108. See infra Section III.A (recognizing a puzzle about whether the contacts-aspresence metonymy was ever “live” as opposed to purely subconscious).
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opinion are all the more important.109 The Brennan opinion, however,
crucially recognizes that International Shoe and Shaffer must control the
inquiry,110 and by the same token, crucially recognizes that there are
certain “outer limits” to the constitutionality of tag jurisdiction, based
for example on involuntary or unknowing presence.111 (The Scalia
opinion mentions the possibility of such outer limits but only to wrest
them into service as support for the historical argument that tag
jurisdiction itself is of long standing.)112 These outer limits are really
the issue, from a judicial process point of view.113 The main question
posed by the Scalia/Brennan divide is whether the legal system should
allow today’s judges to judge the tradition against a new standard; or
instead, neuter today’s judges by holding them to judgments made
many decades ago—subconsciously and primitively, as the body of this
Article will argue.114 And maybe Burnham itself is closer to the outer
limits than Brennan thinks! Three days is not very long and part of
those three days were for a business trip and therefore unrelated to the
children, let alone to the divorce proceeding for which he was
tagged.115 Moreover, that business trip was at the other end of
California, a geographically large state.116 And finally, for Dennis to
want to see his kids is not a lightly held human need—does due process
really allow adverse parties to capitalize on this?117
109. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice
Scalia that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally permits a
state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while
voluntarily present in the forum State.”).
110. Id. at 628–33.
111. Id. at 637 n.11. Suppose, for example, that Francie Burnham tagged Dennis with
her summons while he was in California solely for the purpose of defending himself in
an unrelated lawsuit. Or suppose that she tagged him while he was hiking in in the Lake
Tahoe area of Nevada but had inadvertently strayed over the California state line. Scalia’s
opinion in the case refers briefly to “force or fraud” and presence in the jurisdiction “as
a party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings.” See supra note 103.
112. See supra note 103. “These exceptions obviously rested upon the premise that
service of process [would otherwise have] conferred jurisdiction.” Burnham, 495 U.S.
at 613 (plurality opinion).
113. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 613 (casually dismissing scenarios in which tag
jurisdiction may unfairly burden defendants).
114. See generally infra Part II.
115. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608.
116. Id.
117. Cf. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that even promises extracted by duress may not be involuntary, “unless
‘involuntary’ is a conclusion rather than the description of a mental state”). “If the
threat is ferocious (‘your money or your life’) and believed, the victim may be
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Many criticisms of the Burnham case have been voiced by others,118
and it is not this Article’s job to rehearse them. Instead, Part II of the
Article will develop a new ground of critique.
D. Physical Presence or Minimum Contacts: Which One Really Came First?
It is crucial to note that the Scalia opinion takes for granted a certain
relationship between the traditional approach and the modern approach,
namely that physical presence is primary and that minimum contacts is
secondary—not just temporally but also conceptually. Of course the
minimum contacts standard was announced later in time than the
physical presence test, but Scalia writes that the minimum contacts
standard “was developed by analogy to ‘physical presence,’” and that
accordingly “it would be perverse” to say that the minimum contacts
standard could now be “turned against” physical presence’s “touchstone
of jurisdiction.”119 According to the Scalia opinion, physical presence is
primary, or original, while minimum contacts is secondary, or derivative.

desperately eager to fend it off with a promise.” Id. To flatly take “voluntary” presence
in a jurisdiction, for even the most compelling circumstances, and proceed to equate
that presence with “voluntary” subjection to wholly unrelated lawsuits in the forum,
defies common sense and arguably the Due Process clause.
118. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants:
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593,
593 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and
Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 678–81
(1991); Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A Critique
of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, an Explanation of Why Transient
Presence Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a
Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 502–03, 542 (1991) (arguing that Scalia’s
opinion “seems to yearn for the good old days of territoriality”); Allen R. Kamp, The
Counter-Revolutionary Nature of Justice Scalia’s “Traditionalism,” 27 PAC. L.J. 99, 111 (1995)
(comparing Scalia’s traditionalist opinion to the Anglican Church, which rejects evolving
traditional models for ideal models of the past). Clermont writes that tag jurisdiction:
has also long been the recipient of criticism from academics and foreigners
alike. Formerly the most important basis of U.S. jurisdiction, it is today far
from essential. It is occasionally used to sue foreigners in the United States,
even though the resulting judgment would be unlikely to receive recognition
or enforcement abroad. Indeed, courts use transient jurisdiction, albeit
inappropriately, only when all appropriate bases of jurisdiction are unavailing.
Kevin M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: Views from the United States
and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 17 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
119. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619; see also id. at 618 (“As International Shoe suggests, the
defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical presence
as the basis for jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 620 (referring to “the
‘minimum contact’ that is a substitute for physical presence” (emphasis added)).
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Part II of this Article suggests flipping the above relationship.
Perhaps the relationship presumed by the Scalia opinion has actually
always been the other way around. In other words, perhaps minimum
contacts rather than physical presence has always been the primary
concept—even pre-International Shoe and even pre-Pennoyer. And by the
same token, perhaps physical presence has never been more than a
secondary approximation of minimum contacts, again even preInternational Shoe and even pre-Pennoyer. Or alternatively, perhaps we
can even view physical presence and minimum contacts as two facets
of the same concept. If either of these is the case, then the reasoning
of the Scalia opinion collapses. And metonymy theory, set forth in Part
II, shows how compelling the case can be.
II. CRITIQUING SCALIA’S BURNHAM OPINION
WITH METONYMY THEORY
At one level or another, all judicial decision making is purposive,
and in the modern era that purposiveness has tended to come to the
foreground of judges’ expressed reasoning.120 International Shoe is a
clear example: the opinion forthrightly changes the law for the
express purpose of accommodating inherited doctrine to new social
realities.121 By contrast, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham expressly
appeals not to purpose but solely to the authority of the past, namely
physical presence having for so long been a “touchstone” of personal
jurisdiction.122 Completely absent from the opinion is any attention to
why the basic service-while-present rule developed in the first place,
and of whether those reasons truly supported the related rule of tag
jurisdiction (assuming that tag jurisdiction ever was truly a rule)123—let

The assertedly longstanding nature of the physical presence rule is crucial to Justice
Scalia’s reasoning, because an ancient rule will more easily pass Due Process muster than
a new one. See supra note 104.
120. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (recognizing that
legal decisions need to reflect changing social norms).
121. Id.
122. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. Even this opinion is purposive, of course, though at
a more subterranean and unarticulated level, presumably having much to do with the
valuing of authority for its own sake and the constraining of judicial discretion. See
generally infra Section III.B.
123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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let alone the vital question of whether those reasons continue to be
convincing in the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries.124 Purposive
124. Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion is thus a departure not just from International
Shoe but also from the main stream of recent personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
Notably, first, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court restricted a
forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over corporations organized in other
states to forums in which the corporation is “fairly regarded as at home,” that is, forums
roughly equivalent to an individual’s domicile. 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). The Court
invoked a classic law journal article naming domicile, place of incorporation, and
principal place of business as “the paradigm bases for the exercise of general
jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEX. L. REV. 723, 782 (1988)). Later, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court held the
Goodyear paradigms to be exhaustive and rejected the exercise of personal jurisdiction
even in another forum where the defendant “engages in a substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business.” 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014); see also Stempel, supra note
99, at 1250 (noting that general jurisdiction resembles tag jurisdiction insofar as the
cause of action need not have any substantive relationship to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum and arguing that the retrenchment shown by Goodyear and Daimler
supports a corresponding restriction on tag jurisdiction).
The incongruity between Goodyear and Daimler on one hand, and Burnham on
the other, has been expressly noted. In her concurring opinion to Daimler, Justice
Sotomayor notes the “incongruous result” that an individual can be tagged with
process based on a one-time visit to the forum, while “a large corporation that owns
property, employs workers, and does billions of dollars’ worth of business in the State
will not be, simply because the corporation has similar contacts elsewhere (though the
visiting individual surely does as well).” 571 U.S. at 158 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
judgment); see also Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear
Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 548 (2012) (pointing out the “bizarre fact” that after
Goodyear, it is “much easier to establish general jurisdiction over individuals than over
corporations” because of Burnham).
For a recent case closely analogous to Burnham and rejecting the exercise of
general jurisdiction, see King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir.
2011), finding that “beginning the process of applying to do business and appointing
an agent for service of process” is merely dipping one’s toe into the state and
insufficient on due process grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction. For further
consideration of the susceptibility of corporations or other entity defendants to tag
jurisdiction, see Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46
N.M. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016), advocating for the availability of tag jurisdiction over
corporations and other entities through in-state service on their officers; Tanya J.
Monestier, You’re It! Tag Jurisdiction over Corporations in Canada, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 583, 583–84 (2017), critiquing a recent Supreme Court of Canada opinion that, in
the author’s view, essentially endorses tag jurisdiction over corporations.
Regarding specific jurisdiction as well as general jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has been narrowing the range of fora in which a corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1781 (2017) (denying specific jurisdiction over drug manufacturer where many but
not all of the drug user/plaintiffs lived in the forum state); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct.
1115, 1126 (2014) (finding that in suit by Nevada resident over Drug Enforcement
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judges, lawyers, and scholars demand reasons for rules being the way they
are; the only good rule is a rule supported by good reasons.125
Part II of this Article suggests a highly plausible linguistic and
cognitive reason that early judges might have adopted the servicewhile-present rule, and this reason leads to a rich critique of Scalia’s
Burnham opinion. The argument is that judges in earlier centuries
would have subconsciously taken presence within the jurisdiction as a
convenient approximation or reference point—a metonymy—for the
defendant having a reasonable level of contacts with the jurisdiction.
After all, in the pre-modern era, with cross-border transportation and
communication being so laborious, a person could not, as a practical
matter, have much, if any, contacts with a jurisdiction without being
present there, and the need for tag jurisdiction would rarely, if ever, arise.
So, the argument goes, it is not that presence, for these early judges, had
some kind of inherent significance of its own; rather, presence was
associated with contacts. We can say, in other words, that the thinking
behind International Shoe actually predated the thinking behind Pennoyer!
Minimum contacts, not presence, has always been the “touchstone”126 of
personal jurisdiction. It just wasn’t always articulated this way because the
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy was subconscious.
From this insight, it becomes easy to demolish Scalia’s Burnham
opinion.
The twentieth century’s easy and rapid modern
transportation made it possible for persons to be physically located in
a jurisdiction without having a level of contacts that makes it
reasonable for them to be haled into that jurisdiction’s courts. To
uphold tag jurisdiction under these circumstances is, in Shaffer’s words,
to support “an ancient form without substantial modern
justification.”127 Presence in the jurisdiction is only a formal
approximation, dating from an earlier era, and contacts with the
jurisdiction is the substance for which those early judges were
Administration deputy for allegedly tortious conduct at Georgia airport, Nevada court
lacked specific jurisdiction because the asserted Nevada injury did not meaningfully
connect the defendant to the forum); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873,
886 (2011) (holding, in a personal injury suit against a non-U.S. manufacturer of a
shearing machine, that the court did not have specific jurisdiction over the defendant
because its conduct had not been purposefully directed toward the forum state).
125. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (explaining that rules that are “arbitrary and lacking in common sense”
should not stand).
126. Id. at 619 (plurality opinion).
127. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); see also supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
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reaching. Scalia should have followed that earlier substance rather
than supporting the ancient form.
In sum, Scalia treats service-while-present in the jurisdiction as being
conceptually and historically primary, with minimum contacts being a
mere later approximation of presence. This Article suggests, by
contrast, that minimum contacts is conceptually and historically
primary, with presence in the jurisdiction having been an early
distortion of minimum contacts. The distortion was first introduced by
judges of an earlier era, but they, of course, are blameless because the
society in which they lived and reasoned had no reason to distinguish
between presence and effects. That this distortion was accepted and
perpetuated by the Scalia opinion, though, is thoroughly blameworthy.
A. Metonymy and Metaphor, Live and Dead
Metonymy is a linguistic and conceptual device in which a person
refers to one thing for the conscious or subconscious purpose of
denoting another thing. To elaborate on this Article’s initial example,
a newscaster might say, “The White House today nominated fourteen
individuals to fill vacancies on the federal bench.” Of course, the
newscaster does not mean that a white building from the Federal-style
of architecture somehow uttered the words of nomination; instead, he
or she is referring to the building as a way of referring to the persons
and powers of the executive branch of the U.S. government.
But simply describing metonymy as a reference to one thing in order
to denote another does not adequately distinguish metonymy from
metaphor; and, in fact, metonymy is perhaps most easily described by
contrast to metaphor. Both devices are tools for abstract reasoning,
often at the subconscious level. Metaphor draws upon a relationship
of similarity between things in two different domains—that is, two
different areas of human experience. For example, when a professor
inquires whether her students are “grasping the concept” under
discussion, she of course is not asking whether the students are literally
holding the concept firmly in their hands; instead, she is making use
of the similarities between manual holding and mental understanding.
Of course, on one level, the domain of holding is very different from
the domain of understanding: the first is physical, observable, and
relates to objects, while the second is mental, invisible, and relates to
thoughts. Nonetheless, there is a network of similarities between the
two domains—for example, if we grasp something, then we can look at
it closely or from different angles, and we can pass it along to another
person. Indeed, a moment’s reflection makes clear that people very
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often conceive of thinking or understanding (the second domain) in
terms of holding or manipulating objects (the first domain).128 In sum,
metaphor connects two different domains and thereby posits certain
similarities between them. In common speech, understanding is
posited to be similar to grasping; to Shakespeare’s Romeo, Juliet is
similar to the sun;129 and to Katy Perry, having a unique and vital
personality is similar to giving off light that sparkles in darkness.130
In contrast to metaphor with its two different domains, metonymy
involves only one domain, and the two elements of the single
metonymic domain are connected by a relationship not of similarity
but of contiguity—that is, physical or conceptual connectedness, or
closeness, or strong association.131 In the newscaster example above,
128. A few examples from ordinary speech help to establish the prevalent nature of
the conceptual linkage:
[I]deas are objects that you can play with, toss around, or turn over in your mind.
To understand an idea is to grasp it, to get it, to have it firmly in mind.
Communication is exchanging ideas. Thus, you can give someone ideas and get
ideas across to people. Teaching is putting ideas into the minds of students,
cramming their heads full of ideas. To fail to understand is to fail to grasp, as
when an idea goes over your head or right past you. Problems with understanding
may arise when an idea is slippery, when someone throws too many things at you
at once, or when someone throws you a curve.
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 240 (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH].
Theorists today generally view metaphors as being conceptual rather than
purely linguistic, so that spoken or written phrases like “grasping the concept” are
“metaphorical expressions” as distinct from the underlying, more general conceptual
relationship of MANUAL HOLDING FOR MENTAL UNDERSTANDING. Retracing this thesis is
beyond the scope of this Article but is well explored in PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH and
elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 240–41; GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND xi (1987) [hereinafter LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS]. In law, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN
THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND xi (2001). On thinking as object manipulation in
particular, see Bjerre, supra note 24, at 112–14.
129. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 3 (J.A. Bryant, Jr. ed., 1986)
(“But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks? It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.”).
130. Katy Perry, Firework, on TEENAGE DREAM (Capitol Records 2010) (“Baby, you’re
a firework[.]”).
131. “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle,
provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same
idealized cognitive model.” Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 21 (emphasis added).
“In the example of She’s a pretty face, the ‘pretty face’ serves as the vehicle for accessing
the ‘person’ as the target; in the reverse description, She’s a pretty person, the ‘person’
serves as the vehicle for accessing the person’s ‘pretty face’ as the target.” Id. at 19. See
generally DIRK GEERAERTS, DIACHRONIC PROTOTYPE SEMANTICS: A CONTRIBUTION TO
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there is no particular similarity between the white Federal-style
building (the vehicle) and the powers of the executive branch (the
target), but they are connected to each other because the former is the
symbol of the latter, and the former is the primary location from which
the public perceives the latter as being exercised. To take another
common example, if one server at a diner tells another that “[t]he ham
sandwich is waiting for his check,”132 of course the clear meaning of the
HISTORICAL LEXICOLOGY 97 (1997) (describing how “entities . . . related by contiguity
can be said to have something to do with each other in an objective sense: they interact
or co-occur in reality, and not just in the mind of the beholder”).
The concept of idealized cognitive model, or ICM, is beyond the scope of this
Article, but one can gloss it as referring to abstractions based on domains or realms of
experience. Cf. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 21 (describing metonymic processes
as linking different “ontological realms”). The idea of sameness or singleness of a domain
is what is important here. The term “contiguity” literally denotes physical connectedness,
but in modern discussions of metonymy the term is used more loosely (metaphorically, in
fact) to mean relatedness. See, e.g., JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION:
PROTOTYPES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 123–24 (2d ed. 1995) (“[C]onnections between entities
which co-occur within a given conceptual structure . . . . The entities need not be
contiguous, in any spatial sense.”).
In 1956, the great Russian structuralist, Roman Jakobson, provided an incisive
contrast of metaphor and metonymy in the context of aphasia patients. See Roman
Jakobson, Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF LANGUAGE 57, 58–82 (1956). Jakobson identifies two poles of
aphasia, the “contiguity disorder” and the “similarity disorder,” as constituting a
spectrum along which patients can be classified. Id. at 63, 71. Patients near the former
pole are unable to linguistically express contiguity and must instead resort to metaphor
(i.e. to expressions of similarity), while patients near the latter pole are unable to
linguistically express similarity and must instead resort to metonymy (i.e. to
expressions of contiguity). Id. at 76. For patients near the pole of similarity disorder,
“contiguity determines the patients’ whole verbal behavior . . . .” Id. at 70. As Jakobson
suggests by referring to poles rather than clear-cut categories, the distinctions between
metaphor and metonymy are not always clear-cut. See, e.g., KATHRYN ALLAN, METAPHOR
AND METONYMY: A DIACHRONIC APPROACH 182 (2008) (noting that metaphor and
metonymy should be viewed on a continuum with “uncontroversial cases” at either end
and “‘messier,’ less prototypical cases which involve a greater degree of subjective
judgment somewhere between the two”); Nick Riemer, When is a Metonymy No Longer a
Metonymy?, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN COMPARISON AND CONTRAST 379, 383–88
(René Dirven & Ralf Pörings eds., 2003) (discussing ambiguities and indeterminacy in
the line between metaphor and metonymy, for example, with regard to an expression
like “the landlady kicked him out of the house”).
132. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 35 (1980)
[hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY]. Remarks by coffee shop
servers about menu items seem to have fascinated metonymy theorists for some reason.
See, e.g., id. at 38 (“The BLT is a lousy tipper.”); LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS, supra note 128, at 77 (“The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself.”);
RAY JACKENDOFF, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE LANGUAGE FACULTY 54 (1997) (“The ham
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sentence is that the customer who ordered the ham sandwich—rather than
the construct of white bread, yellow mustard, and lunch meat—is
waiting for the check.133 The real meaning (i.e. the customer as target)
and the surface expression (i.e. the sandwich as vehicle) are related,
though, at least by the fact that the former ordered the latter.
Metonymy often takes a relatively complex intended referent, such
as an intricate concept or social phenomenon (think a defendant’s
contacts with a forum state), and substitutes for it a simpler surface
referent such as a physical object or physical relationship (think a
defendant’s presence in the forum state).134 Examples from everyday
life might include saying, “My cousin is a brain,” instead of describing
the cousin’s intelligence, introverted personality, or the like; or, saying,
“Senator So-and-So is an empty suit,” instead of describing the
senator’s ineffectuality, insincerity, or tendency to rely on style rather
than substance. Alternatively, metonymy may take a phrase that is
relatively cumbersome to articulate (for example because it demands
more words, or contextually superfluous words), and substitutes for it

sandwich in the corner wants some more coffee.”); TAYLOR, supra note 131, at 123
(“The pork chop left without paying.” (emphasis omitted)); Geoffrey Nunberg, The
Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy, 3 LINGUISTICS AND PHIL. 143, 149 (1979)
[hereinafter Nunberg, Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions] (“The ham sandwich is
sitting at table 20.”); Geoffrey Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning, 12 J. OF SEMANTICS 109,
115 (1995) [hereinafter Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning] (“Who is the ham sandwich?”
and “The ham sandwich is at table 7.”); David Stallard, Two Kinds of Metonymy,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING ON THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS 87 (1993) (“The hamburger is waiting for his check.”).
The contrast between ham sandwiches on one hand, and a defendant’s
susceptibility to personal jurisdiction on the other, highlights the enormous practical
importance that the linguistic theory of metonymy (not to mention metaphor and
other linguistic devices) can carry, when brought out of the relatively controlled
precincts of linguistics and into the unruly realities of law.
133. Apart from common sense, grammar helps to prove that the customer, rather
than the sandwich, is the real referent of the sentence in the text above. Otherwise
the possessive pronoun “his” would not be used. See Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning,
supra note 132, at 115 (pointing out that, “That french fries is getting impatient” is a
normal English sentence, but “Those french fries are getting impatient” is not).
134. The idea of “substitution” in this context is, today, considered to be only a
simplified or approximate way of describing the operation of metonymy. The current
more precise thinking is that a metonymy’s source or vehicle “activates” the
conceptually more complex target in the hearer or reader’s mind. See generally Antonio
Barcelona, The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY
AT THE CROSSROADS: A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Barcelona ed., 2003).
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a phrase that is more economical to articulate.135 In “The ham
sandwich is waiting for his check,” superfluous words are saved,
because of course the source of the impatience to which the first server
is alerting the second server is a person, and when that fact is so
obvious, there is no need for the busy servers to make explicit reference
to that person himself rather than his relevant distinguishing factor.136
In either case—complexity of the referent or complexity of the proper
locution of the referent—the process of mental simplification is surely
one of the reasons why ordinary human minds have tended to make
metonymy such a prevalent device. It helps people’s thought and
language processes to function, so, of course, people often use it.137
Some metaphors are said to be “dead” rather than “live,” and the
concept can apply to metonymy too. The proper dividing line between

135. Lakoff generalizes, in the slightly different context of models of categories,
that a vehicle will be chosen when compared to the target; the vehicle is “either easier
to understand, easier to remember, easier to recognize, or more immediately useful
for the given purpose in the given context.” LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS, supra note 128, at 84.
136. Informal evidence (the author’s father owned a coffee shop) suggests that ham
sandwiches are a relatively distinctive item to order from the menu.
A similar example would be a departing restaurant patron handing her car key
to a parking lot attendant and saying, “I’m parked out back,” saving the unnecessary
reference to the car itself, which goes without saying in the context of this interaction.
See Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning, supra note 132, at 110 (giving a similar example
without reference to the expression being economical). Nunberg’s article shows that
metonymy and metaphor are both devices that enable transfers of meaning, that is,
“us[ing] the same expression to refer to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of
things.” Id. at 109.
137. Professor Langacker describes metonymy in terms of a “reference-point
construction”:
[T]he entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as
a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (i.e., the entity
actually being referred to) . . . . Metonymy . . . occurs in the first place because
it serves a useful cognitive and communicative function. What is this function?
Metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the
need to be accurate, i.e., of being sure that the addressee’s attention is
directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk
explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for
us . . . . [A] well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that
is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke—essentially automatically—a
target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name.
Ronald W. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 1, 30
(1993) [hereinafter Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions]; see also RONALD W.
LANGACKER, GRAMMAR AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 199 (1999) (chapter 6 being an
adaptation of the 1993 article).
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dead and live metaphors is unsettled; however, the standard view is that
a dead metaphor is one that has become “conventional.” This means
that the metaphor has been adopted as a standard part of linguistic
expression, so that speakers and hearers treat it literally, without the
metaphor reflecting an imaginative act of cognition.138 For example,
the expression, “We’re at a crossroads in our relationship,” is
metaphorical, comparing the domains of having a romantic
relationship and traveling along a path—but this expression can more
specifically be said to be a dead metaphor, because it has become a
conventional part of the modern English language such that
“crossroads” can now literally mean not just an intersection, but also
any important decision-point.139

138. E.g., H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 348–49 (1937)
(distinguishing between live metaphors, which “are offered and accepted with a
consciousness of their nature as substitutes for their literal equivalents” and dead
metaphors, which “have been so often used that speaker & hearer have ceased to be
aware that the words are not literal”); cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN
COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 55 (1989); CORNELIA MÜLLER,
METAPHORS DEAD AND ALIVE, SLEEPING AND WAKING: A DYNAMIC VIEW 221 (2008)
(“[D]ead metaphors may be activated in speaking and writing and become very much
alive indeed. Regarded as elements of a linguistic system they may be dead,
entrenched, or novel; as elements used in speech, they oscillate between sleeping and
waking, depending on the degrees of activated metaphoricity in given contexts of
use.”). The Pat Benatar song title, Love is a Battlefield, on LIVE FROM EARTH (Chrysalis
1983), is one good example of a live metaphor. See also Zadie Smith, On the Road:
American Writers and Their Hair, spoken word performance at Neal Pollack’s & Timothy
McSweeney’s Festival of Literature, Theater, and Music (July 26, 2001), transcript
available at http://eyeshot.net/zadiesmith.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (“Kansas
City is oven hot, dead metaphor or no dead metaphor.”).
The fact that the dividing line between dead and live metaphors is unsettled
might reflect the fact that the label “dead metaphor” is itself metaphorical, because it
draws together the domains of life or death on one hand and cognitive activity on the
other. See Bjerre, supra note 24, at 127 n.83. In fact, among linguists, the expression
“dead metaphor” is probably not only metaphorical but also a dead metaphor.
139. See Crossroad, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59 (2nd ed. 1989) (defining
“crossroad” as both “[t]he place where two roads cross each other” and “[a] point at
which two or more courses of action diverge; a critical turning point”).
Lakoff, Johnson, and most other cognitivists contend that the category of dead
metaphors is actually much smaller than just described. In their view, a metaphor
must be judged as live or dead at the level of its underlying concepts, not at the level
of the particular expressions that instantiate the metaphor. See LAKOFF & TURNER,
supra note 138, at 97. The particular expression, “We’re at a crossroads in our
relationship” is just one instantiation of the conceptual metaphor love is a journey,
which continues to be alive and productive of new expressions that have not been
conventionalized. E.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 128,
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A metonymy, similarly, might be said to “die” when it becomes
conventionalized.140 Nick Riemer discusses the example of “breast
beating,”141 which is well understood as referring to an ostentatious
expression of sadness or guilt—for example, a politician’s flowery
lamenting of a problem, unconnected with constructive efforts to solve
it. Riemer argues that “breast beating” is not metaphorical, even
though the domain of physically striking one’s own body is different
from the domain of expressing emotion; instead “breast beating” is a
metonymy that has become conventionalized and is accordingly
dubbed by Riemer a post-metonymy.142 Similarly the political terms
“left” and “right” are relatively dead metonymies, having originally
referred literally to legislative seating arrangements during the French
Revolution.143 If the expression “nice wheels” as a way of expressing
admiration for means of transportation survives into future years in
which people use jet-packs and no longer remember cars, the
expression will have become a dead metonymy. Nonetheless “the
relevance of metonymy or metaphor as the explanatory principle
behind an extension does not disappear when an extended meaning
becomes conventionalized or generalized.”144
Regardless of whether they are live or dead, metaphors and
metonymies are overwhelmingly subconscious, both in how speakers or
writers produce them and in how hearers or readers understand them.145

at 122–27; LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 55. On dead metaphors generally, see
MÜLLER, supra note 138, at 221.
140. There is a parallel in metonymy theory to the thinking discussed in supra note
139 about the continuing vitality of seemingly dead metaphors. “A linguistic
expression may eventually cease to be used metaphorically or metonymically but the
corresponding conceptual projection may still be alive and be reflected in other
linguistic expressions.
And the more entrenched conceptual metaphors or
metonymies, those with a more direct bodily basis seldom, if ever, die.” Barcelona,
supra note 134, at 5 (citing LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 49–67).
141. Riemer, supra note 131, at 392–94.
142. Id. The expression “breast beating” is “a metonymy that is no longer manifest
in most of the occurrences of the figure, where no breast beating will occur.” Id. at
393. With expressions like this, “their contexts of use have ‘overshot’ the domains of
their original appropriateness . . . .” Id. at 394.
143. E.g., Jesse Norman, Where Did the Right and the Left Come From?, THE SPECTATOR
(Feb. 15, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/02/the-great-debate-byyuval-levin-review.
144. NICK RIEMER, THE SEMANTICS OF POLYSEMY: READING MEANING IN ENGLISH AND
WARLPIRI 203 (2005).
145. On the initially surprising notion of a metaphor being subconscious but still
live, see LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 129 (noting that it is a mistake to discount
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With metaphor, in 99 out of 100 cases, when one friend confides to
another that he or she is “in a relationship that is going nowhere,” the
speaker is not consciously choosing to highlight similarities between the
domains of having a relationship and of going down a path, nor is the
hearer noticing and then decoding the fact that one domain is being
described in terms of another. Similarly, with metonymy, when one busy
diner server warns another that “the ham sandwich is waiting for his
check,” the speaker is acting subconsciously, and for convenience as
noted above, when he or she omits the direct reference to the customer.
(It is absurdly entertaining to imagine this metonymy being conscious.
“Hmm, all of the checks that I and my co-worker write are for human
beings, and when I warn my co-worker about one of those human beings
becoming impatient, both I and my co-worker really just want the check
to be written and delivered, so that the most salient aspect in this context
is the dish for which the customer is being charged. I might as well do us
both a favor by cutting directly to that chase rather than making a needless
reference to the human being.”).146

the cognitive importance of dead metaphors, and explaining that those things in our
cognition that are most alive and active are not necessarily those that are conscious;
instead, those that are most alive are so automatic as to be unconscious).
146. Sometimes metaphor and metonymy are deployed rhetorically, as the result of
conscious choice on the part of the speaker. See, e.g., JONATHAN CHARTERIS-BLACK,
POLITICIANS AND RHETORIC: THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF METAPHOR 2 (2005) (discussing
the use of metaphor in political messages); GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN
ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE 56 (2004) (examining the
strategic use of metaphorical framing in political discourse); KATHLEEN AHRENS,
POLITICS, GENDER AND CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS 1 (Kathleen Ahrens ed., 2009)
(discussing the use of metaphorical framing as applied to gender-related issues);
Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 52–53 (exploring the use of metonymy for specific
rhetorical purposes); Judith A. Harris, Recognizing Legal Tropes: Metonymy as
Manipulative Mode, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1215, 1223 (1985) (discussing the Jakobson model
and exploring manipulability of choice of law doctrine); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor,
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign
Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 955–57 (2007) (analyzing the framework
from Lakoff and Johnson); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative
Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009) (exploring the way canonical
texts can be invoked as arguments for larger associated ideas). Marketing experts still
commonly use metonymy with brand names, such as Impala for a car, presumably
intending to efficiently capture otherwise nebulous qualities like swiftness, grace, and
strength. See STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO
HUMAN NATURE 303 (2007) (stating that companies choose brand names to “connot[e]
a quality they wished to ascribe”). Even in these conscious deployments of metaphor
and metonymy, economy and convenience of the hearer or reader’s thought is still a
primary motivator, and so too, often, is the hearer or reader’s subconscious.
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Indeed, the subconscious nature of metaphor and metonymy is a large
part of what makes them so useful. Our conscious minds are crowded and
busy, like the calendar of a C.E.O., and for the mind to relegate certain
forms of thought to the subconscious is somewhat like the C.E.O.
delegating certain tasks to her legions of staff members. It frees the valuable
conscious attention for other things. By the same token, it creates risks of
things going wrong, as explored with presence in Section II.B.
B. Presence as a Metonymy for Minimum Contacts
This Section II.B. presents the heart of this Article’s argument,
namely that the longstanding criterion of service-while-present in the
jurisdiction is perhaps best understood as never having been more
than a metonymy for what is now familiar to us as the minimum
contacts standard. The service-while-present rule predates Pennoyer,
but the Scalia opinion in Burnham bizarrely perpetuated it as being
sufficient to support tag jurisdiction, even in the absence of the
minimum contacts that International Shoe found to be at the heart of
due process. My argument is that the pre-Pennoyer judges who
developed the service-while-present rule did so because, in their era
predating modern communication, a defendant’s contacts with a
jurisdiction were always accompanied by the defendant’s presence in
the jurisdiction—hence, there was no practical need to distinguish
contacts from presence, and the judges articulated the rule in terms of
presence rather than contacts in accordance with the ordinary
principles of metonymy.
Overall, the central issue that this Section II.B. addresses is the
question of why the pre-Pennoyer judges chose to express the rule in
terms of presence, rather than in terms of contacts, if indeed what they
really meant is the contacts rather than the presence. In linguistic terms,
the question is why the judges employed any metonymy at all, and in
particular why they employed presence as the metonymy’s vehicle.147
The answers are rich, taking several forms. They are set out below,
some of them echoing and some of them deepening the basic
understanding of metonymy already presented in Section II.A. When
all of the following are taken together, it becomes apparent that the
metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is strongly motivated—that is, a
number of selection principles converge in establishing the
147. See supra note 131 for a discussion of vehicle and target as the constituent
elements of metonymy. Generally, the vehicle, which is articulated, provides cognitive
access to the target, which is not articulated.
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naturalness and expectability of the judges having articulated the rule
as they did.148 The judges selected a highly natural vehicle with which
to access their target.
1. Simplification by reference to a contiguous and closely associated feature
As seen in Section II.A, simplification by reference to a contiguous
feature is one of the basic reasons why a speaker or writer (in this case,
the judges of the early service-while-present era) would use a
metonymy at all. Presence in a jurisdiction is of course a simpler
concept than “minimum contacts with that jurisdiction such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice,”149 or any similar notion.150 Presence is a simple
black-or-white criterion that can be determined with little or no effort
on a judge’s part—a boilerplate affidavit by the process server will
suffice. By contrast, the minimum contacts standard is highly nuanced
and fact sensitive; there will often be cases close to the line with which
the judge’s mind and conscience must wrestle.151
Presence in the jurisdiction is contiguous with contacts therewith,
because presence and contacts are both aspects of the same domain of
life experience. That is, both are elementary and utterly familiar facets
of the fact that a person (the defendant) exists: he or she goes to places
and occupies their space; he or she does things while in that space, and
those actions have effects. Moreover, physical presence is closely
associated with effects. During the historical era in which the servicewhile-present rule was promulgated, it was unusual for a person to have
148. Thus, PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is a better motivated metonymy than some
others, in which some selection principles are at odds with others. E.g., Radden &
Kövecses, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing an example, “The buses are on strike,” which fits
with principles such as interactional over non-interactional but does not fit with other
principles such as human over non-human).
149. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
150. The quotation marks in this sentence risk conveying the unintended
impression that the target of a metonymy must itself be linguistic. See infra notes 153–
157 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
“[t]hough neither side decisively triumphs under this analysis, it appears that there was
enough . . . to compel a finding of jurisdiction”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks,
Inc., No. 17-cv-00561, 2017 WL 3485881, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (denying a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when the requisite knowledge was not
proven but certain “allegations make it sufficiently plausible to infer knowledge”);
Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1009–11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (discussing the
competing interests to protect a child from hardship and discourage circumvention of
foreign law in declining to exercise personal jurisdiction in a custody dispute).
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effects in a place without being physically present there. Before the
modern advent of easy transportation and communication, contacts
with a forum were impossible without physical presence.
At first glance, there is a notable difference between the judicial
thinking process that this Article posits and the examples of metonymy
described above; namely, that in the examples above, a careful and selfconscious speaker or writer would have been able to avoid the
metonymy if he or she wished. (The coffee shop server could have
referred explicitly to the customer who ordered the ham sandwich; the
newscaster could have referred to the particular Executive Branch
official who nominated the prospective judges, or to the constitutional
basis from which the official derives his or her power). In other words,
at first glance, metonymy is a purely linguistic phenomenon, limited to
the simple substitution of one articulation for another, with the
unused articulation nonetheless being relatively easily available to the
speaker, albeit disfavored as discussed above. And by contrast, the
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy as used by the pre-Pennoyer judges
involves the use of one articulation for an as-yet unformulated
concept—indeed a rather abstruse concept which would not be
articulated by anyone until the era of International Shoe.152 So the
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy does not involve a simple
substitution of one articulation for another and hence it is different
from the other metonymies discussed heretofore in a way that must be
explained if the hypothesis is to be sustained.
The explanation lies in the idea, well recognized in cognitive
linguistics, that metonymy is not solely linguistic—metonymy is also
and perhaps primarily cognitive. That is, metonymy operates at the
level of thinking and understanding, not just at the level of speaking.
Professors Radden and Kövecses explicitly reject the idea that
“metonymy operates on names of things” or “involves the substitution
of the name of one thing for that of another thing,”153 and instead
argue that metonymy is cognitive in that it leads to the formation of
“new, complex meaning.”154 Similarly, Professor Barcelona points out
that metonymy is frequently involved in a number of “generally
‘invisible’ conceptual operations or conceptual structures (i.e.
operations/structures not directly coded by a particular linguistic form) that

152. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
153. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 17.
154. Id. at 19.
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underlie online linguistic processing,”155 and that this is evidence “both
of the conceptual nature of metonymy and of the fact that metonymy is
not confined to lexical meaning.”156
Once one realizes that metonymy is cognitive and not simply
linguistic,157 its use by the pre-Pennoyer judges in initially and clumsily
formulating ideas such as contacts with the jurisdiction is perfectly
natural, and PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS ceases to look like a troubling or
aberrant case. Instead, the fact that the targets in examples like the ham
sandwich and the White House could have been so easily paraphrased
by those speakers is an accidental attribute. The most noteworthy aspect
of all of these metonymies is simply their subconscious nature. The
vehicle is always articulated, but the target is not necessarily something
that could have been articulated instead.
2. Patterns of salience
Professor Langacker points out that metonymy is a device that lets
us mention a vehicle that is “salient and easily coded” in order to evoke
a less salient or harder to name target.158 Salient means prominent or
conspicuous,159 and Langacker and others have identified a number of
principles that help to make a given vehicle salient to ordinary human
beings based on their ordinary life experience.160
One prime principle is that humans are more salient than non-humans.
(Following this principle, the defendant him or herself would be more
salient than his or her effects.) Langacker remarks that “[p]eople make

155. Antonio Barcelona, Metonymy is Not Just a Lexical Phenomenon: On the Operation of
Metonymy in Grammar and Discourse, in SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 2008 STOCKHOLM
METAPHOR FESTIVAL 13, 17 (Nils-Lennart Johannesson & David C. Minugh, eds., 2009)
(emphasis added).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Indeed, thinking of metonymy in purely linguistic terms is metonymic. The
relatively easy to access and articulate vehicle of language is substituted for the more
amorphous and difficult to articulate target of cognition.
158. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30.
159. See Salient, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 392 (2nd ed. 1989) (“Of immaterial
things, qualities, etc.: Standing out from the rest; prominent, conspicuous”). The
word is etymologically and metaphorically related to “jumping out.” Id. at 392.
160. At the risk of stating the obvious, the category of ordinary human beings
includes judges. See Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Bankruptcy Theory and the Acceptance of
Ambiguity, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 376 (2006) (“In this modern era we have come far
enough to know that law is not an artificial mode of reasoning, to recognize that judges
are no more or less human than the rest of us, and even to accept that judicial minds
work in much the same way as ordinary people’s minds.”).
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especially good reference points,”161 and Radden and Kövecses write that
“[o]ur basic human experiences are derived from our anthropocentric
view of the world and our interaction in the world,” in which “humans
take precedence over non-humans.”162 As applied to metonymy this is
evidenced, for example, by the frequency with which we refer to “a
Picasso” rather than the more accurate “a painting by Picasso” or even
more difficult related concepts.163 Langacker further observes that “a
person is often selected [as a vehicle] even when absent, non-visible, or
no longer in existence (as an integral whole).”164 My argument is that in
formulating the service-while-present rule in terms of PRESENCE FOR
CONTACTS, the early judges articulated the rule in terms of the presence
of the defendant herself, rather than in terms of the effects of the
defendant who in many cases may be present but in other cases may not be
present. Langacker helps us to see that the defendant herself remains a
good vehicle for the metonymy even in cases where she is not present.165
Another important principle is that a whole is more salient than a
part. (Accordingly, the defendant as a whole is more salient than
particular facets of his contacts with the forum.)166 Langacker links

161. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30.
162. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45.
163. “When we think of a Picasso, we are not just thinking of a work of art alone, in
and of itself. We think of it in terms of its relation to the artist, that is, his conception
of art, his technique, his role in art history, etc. We act with reverence toward a Picasso,
even a sketch he made as a teen-ager, because of its relation to the artist.” LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 128, at 39.
164. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30. His examples
include, “She bought Lakoff and Johnson, used and in paper, for just $1.50” and one
involving gravediggers comparing two skulls and saying “Yorick is slightly larger than
Polonius.” Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).
165. If humans are more salient than non-humans, one may wonder why our friends
the coffee-shop servers refer to their customer, who is surely human, as a ham sandwich,
which is not. The answer is “the skewing of salience relationships that specific
circumstances often induce.” Id. at 30. Using the example of one nurse telling another,
“The (vasectomy/herniated disc) in 304 needs a sleeping pill,” Langacker explains that:
nurses may well know virtually nothing about their individual patients except
the nature of their malady or medical procedure; this is what they are primarily
responsible for dealing with. Consequently, when they have to mention a
particular patient (whose name they may not even recall), the malady or
procedure suggests itself as an obvious reference point.
Id. at 29–31.
166. Langacker uses his Yorick and Polonius example, supra note 164, to illustrate
this principle as well as the previous one. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra
note 137, at 30.
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this principle to what he calls the active-zone/profile discrepancy.167 In a
sentence like “The dog bit the cat,” the dog as a whole and the cat as a
whole are profiled (or highlighted by the explicit mention), even
though the active zones (or parts of the dog doing the biting and parts
of the cat being bitten) are much more specific. Langacker tells us
that it is “normal,” “natural,” “expected” and “common” for the active
zones to be left unprofiled. It would be bizarre for a person to say,
instead, “The dog’s teeth, jaws, jaw muscles, and volition bit that
portion of the cat’s tail extending from six to twelve centimeters from
the tip.”168 To be sure, such a sentence would be more accurate, but
“there is a tension between the need to be accurate and our inclination
to focus explicit attention on those entities that most concern us and
have the greatest cognitive salience.”169 Referring to the entity as a
whole focuses attention on it, and “general knowledge and contextual
frames”170 tacitly supply the remainder of the desired accuracy. To us
today, it is a crashingly obvious point that persons in an earlier era
without ready modern communications could not have effects on a
place without being in that place. And to a judge of that early era who
was announcing the service-while-present rule, that same point—while
not obvious, in the same way that water is non-obvious to a fish—would
have certainly been squarely within the judge’s subconscious “general
knowledge and contextual frames.”
Radden and Kövecses identify CAUSE FOR EFFECT as a common
metonymic pattern, giving as an example a person saying “healthy
complexion” instead of “the good state of health bringing about the
effect of healthy complexion.”171 A person, or his or her presence, is, of
course, often a cause of effects on his or her surroundings, and indeed
as already seen it is difficult to imagine such effects happening in the
person’s absence. Relatedly, Radden and Kövecses identify AGENT FOR
167. Ronald W. Langacker, Active Zones, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE BERKELEY LINGUISTICS SOCIETY 172 (1984) [hereinafter Langacker,
Active Zones]; Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 31–35. He also
explains, on the other hand, that the active-zone/profile discrepancy is not limited to
part/whole relationships. Id. at 32–33.
168. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 38, 47 (emphasis omitted). Here they suggest
that the contrary pattern, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, may be more natural because effects are more
perceptible than causes, but I submit that where the cause is a human being and the effect
is not, CAUSE FOR EFFECT is actually more natural in keeping with Langacker’s point about
the salience of humans. See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text.
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as a further common metonymical pattern, giving as examples
the phrase “to author a new book” and “to butcher the cow.”172 (Other
authors identify similar subpatterns, including CONTROLLER FOR
CONTROLLED173 and PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT.174). For a judge to refer
to the defendant him- or herself, rather than to the effects of the
defendant’s actions, is, of course, nicely consistent with these patterns.
And finally for this Section’s purposes is the relationship between
place and event. Markert and Nissim observe that “[a] location name
stands for something that happened there.”175 They give as one clear
example a sentence naming “Bosnia and so on” when the target is the
war that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995.176
Similarly, in a sentence like “He was shocked by Vietnam,” “the name
of the location refers to the event (a war) that happened there.”177
Radden and Kövecses articulate a broader version of the same idea,
illustrating it with similar location/event examples:
ACTION

Metonymy tends to make use of stereotypical, or idealized, relationships
within an ICM. Thus, certain places tend to be associated with events
which typically occur at the place. For example, the expression to go to
bed may, depending on the situation, evoke the metonymic targets ‘to
go to sleep,’ ‘to have sex’ or ‘to be sick.’ All these events are
stereotypically associated with beds . . . . More generally, we may
describe the conceptual relationship between space and event as one
that is entrenched and may be exploited by metonymy.178

The application of this pattern, too, to PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is
clear. The jurisdiction of the early judge articulating the service-while-

172. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 37–38; see also BEATRICE WARREN, SENSE
DEVELOPMENTS: A CONTRASTIVE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SLANG SENSES AND
NOVEL STANDARD SENSES IN ENGLISH 65, 67 (1992) (giving examples of “causer-result”
and “result-causer” metonymies). Radden and Kövecses note that their examples
involve changes of word class (for example, the vehicle noun author is being used as a
verb to describe the target action of writing), and that such changes are typical but not
universal. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 38.
173. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 132, at 38 (giving
examples such as “Nixon bombed Hanoi” and “Ozawa gave a terrible concert last night”).
174. Id. (giving examples such as “I’ll have a Löwenbräu” and “He’s got a Picasso in
his den”); see also NEAL R. NORRICK, SEMIOTIC PRINCIPLES IN SEMANTIC THEORY 45–52
(1981) (providing a taxonomy of types of metonymy including producer/artifact,
cause/effect, natural source/natural product, and instrument/product).
175. Katja Markert & Malvina Nissim, Corpus-Based Metonymy Analysis, 18 METAPHOR
& SYMBOL 175, 180 (2003).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 175.
178. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 22 (emphasis omitted).
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present rule is the place, used as the vehicle. The defendant’s contacts
with that place are, I argue, the target. And it is just as conceptually
natural for the judge to speak in terms of the defendant being present
(meaning that the defendant has had adequate contacts) as it is for a
political observer to say that he is “shocked by Vietnam” (meaning
shocked by the events that took place there).
As one should absolutely expect in light of metonymy’s imaginative
and contextual nature, the particular patterns of salience examined
above are only a few among “a host” of metonymical patterns.179 But
these particular patterns are not random. On the contrary, they all fit
within certain more overarching notions from metonymy theory which
further bolster this Article’s hypothesis.
For example, metonymy theory tells us that a more concrete vehicle
is more likely to be chosen for a more abstract target. Radden and
Kövecses observe that “[o]ur basic human experience relates to
concrete physical objects, which have more salience for us than abstract
objects,”180 using this idea to explain why people say things like “having
one’s hands on something” instead of “controlling something.”181 The
defendant’s physical body is of course more concrete than most of the
remotely-caused effects (a broken promise, an economic loss, an
infringed patent) that he or she has caused in the jurisdiction. Radden
and Kövecses add that one subcase of the preference for concrete over
abstract is the bodily over the actional, accounting for phrases like “hold
your tongue” for the target of “stop speaking.”182 Here, too, the
significance of the defendant’s body is clear.
Similarly, an immediate vehicle is more likely to be chosen for a nonimmediate target, so that speakers or writers tend to use metonymies
based on “stimuli in our spatial, temporal and causal immediacy.”183
Radden and Kövecses give the example of “I’ll answer the phone” for
“I’ll answer the person speaking at the other end of the line” as being
motivated by spatial immediacy, and, of course, the service-whilepresent rule involves the defendant’s immediacy to the court—not
only spatially, because the defendant is present in the jurisdiction, but
179. Riemer, supra note 131, at 382.
180. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45; see also Langacker, Reference-Point
Constructions, supra note 137, at 30 (identifying concrete over abstract as a principle of
cognitive salience).
181. For more on this particular example in the legal context, see supra note 128
and accompanying text.
182. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45.
183. Id. at 47.
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also temporally, because the defendant’s presence is measured at the
time of the service.
In concluding this section, one should briefly note that there are
similar metonymic expressions along the lines of PRESENCE FOR
CONTACTS in today’s everyday non-legal discourse.184 One friend
offering comfort to another will say, “I’m there for you,” even if
speaking by phone from thousands of miles away, and in this case the
vehicle of being “there” evokes the target of having certain effects,
namely emotional support. During the 1990s, the gay rights activist
group Queer Nation popularized the slogan “We’re here, we’re queer,
get used to it”185 with the vehicle of being “here” evoking targets such
as the assertion of social and political power. Conversely, a vehicle of
absence can evoke targets of disengagement, as with Timothy Leary’s
counterculture slogan “Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out.”186 No doubt
the examples could be multiplied.
3. The analogy of children’s naming efforts
As already seen, most or all uses of metonymy are based on
convenience or usefulness, but these terms should not be taken only
in a trivial sense. Certain instances of metonymy usage are so
extremely convenient and useful that they are, in effect, indispensable.
Two instances should be examined here, which are in fact analogous
to each other in important ways: first, a judge who is wrestling with a
new legal concept, the contours of which have not yet become clear,
and second, a child who is still at an early stage of language acquisition.
Using the idea of distributed cognition, this subsection of the Article
argues that a judge’s metonymical wrestling with a not-fully-developed

184. Certain parallels in law as opposed to everyday discourse are addressed in
Section III.C below, and the problem of instances from judicial discourse about
personal jurisdiction in particular during the pre-Pennoyer period is addressed in
Section II.B.3.
185. See Susan Stryker, Queer Nation, GLBTQ ENCYCLOPEDIA (2004),
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/queer_nation_S.pdf.
186. See TIMOTHY LEARY, FLASHBACKS: A PERSONAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF AN ERA
253 (1983):
Turn On meant go within to activate your neural and genetic equipment . . . .
Tune In meant interact harmoniously with the world around you . . . . Drop Out
suggested an active, selective, graceful process of detachment from involuntary
or unconscious commitments. Drop Out meant self-reliance, a discovery of one’s
singularity, a commitment to mobility, choice, and change . . . . Unhappily my
explanations of this sequence of personal development were often
misinterpreted to mean “get stoned and abandon all constructive activity.”
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concept is closely analogous to a child’s metonymical grasping for a
not-fully-rounded vocabulary. This analogy provides further support
for this Article’s hypothesis that early judges, in announcing the
service-while-present rule, were grasping for a concept that in fact was
more nuanced, but that the judges did not yet have the historical
perspective necessary to grasp.
All adults have smiled to see a toddler exclaim “Doggie!” upon
seeing a horse or a rhinoceros, when the toddler does not yet know the
vocabulary words “horse” or “rhinoceros.” The toddler presses into
service what limited vocabulary she has, in order to deal with situations
that are new to her—an extending of words beyond their accepted
definitions that is structurally similar to metonymy. Indeed, Professors
Nerlich, Clarke, and Todd, examining a corpus of such expressions by
children up to age two and a half, call the expressions “compelled
metonymical overextensions.”187 They explain that “at this age a child’s
vocabulary, category and conceptual systems are still relatively small and
unstructured. This scarcity compels them to extend already known
words to cope with increasing communicative needs, to comment on
what they see and to request what they want.”188 Giving a number of
examples of children’s metonymical overextensions, Nerlich and her coauthors summarize that children with limited lexicons:
[f]ocus on one salient feature in a set framework or frame of
repeated interactions with the caregiver or parent. They say book if
they want to read, blow when referring to a match, they say hello for
telephone, and so on. Gradually, through interaction with the
caregiver or parent who grants their requests, the children elaborate
on their comments. Finally, the metonymical overextensions, which
function as place-markers in the interactional and conceptual

187. Nerlich et al., supra note 8, at 364. Nerlich and her co-authors also explore a
second metonymical pattern in children’s language, which they call “creative
metonymical shrinking.” Id. at 369. This pattern is based more on simple convenience
than on necessity and is exemplified by the “I like being a sandwich” phrase in the
article’s title, which is a child’s convenient way of referring to having the ability to
bring his own lunch to school.
188. Id. at 364. We could say that the nature of a child’s groping metonymy is that
it underspecifies the concept in question, or by the same token, it over-extends the
category. The child thinks that the category of doggie only has one criterion for
membership, namely having four legs. A more mature understanding is that there are
other criteria, too, such as barking. The child has two related reasons for overextending the concept: a limited vocabulary and a limited range of experiences on
which to base recognition of the need for additional words.
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frameworks, will be replaced by the ‘proper’ words allocated them
by the adults, such as read, match and telephone.189

Now obviously the judges who developed the service-while-present
rule had fine and nuanced vocabularies. These early judges were also
surely unlike toddlers in being worldly gentlemen with extensive
experience of the then prevailing society. Nonetheless, at a deeper
level, there is a sound analogy here: the early judges are to judges of
the modern era as children are to adults. The early judges simply lacked
experience of future evolutions in communications and cross-border
business transactions much as children lack life experience. As two
writers on metonymy have noted, “our perception of the world is
inseparable from our experience and cognition,”190 and the overarching
fact of any person’s historical era is obviously a compelling factor
helping to constitute that person’s experience.
To spell out the rest of the logic, then, the early judges’ historical
situation caused them to lack the associated vocabulary or conceptual
structure with which to discriminate among the concepts of presence
in a jurisdiction, contacts with the jurisdiction, and presence in the
jurisdiction not generating minimum contacts with it. Hence, the early
judges were unable to articulate the concept of minimum contacts with
anything approaching the degree of nuance by which we know that
concept today.191 Instead, they metonymically overextended their only
189. Id. at 369; see also RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., THE POETICS OF MIND: FIGURATIVE
THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, AND UNDERSTANDING 422–24 (1994) (discussing children’s
invention of verbs from nouns “to fill gaps in their lexicon in particular communicative
situations”); Ewa Konieczna & Grzegorz A. Kleparski, In Search of Evidence for
Metonymically Motivated Innovative Nouns in Children’s Speech, 2 SKASE J. THEORETICAL
LINGUISTICS 43 (2005) (discussing similar children’s neologisms in English and
Polish). On the topic of children’s comprehension rather than usage of metonymic
expressions, see Gabriella Rundblad & Dagmara Annaz, Development of Metaphor and
Metonymy Comprehension: Receptive Vocabulary and Conceptual Knowledge, 28 BRIT. J.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 547, 549 (2010).
190. Konieczna & Kleparski, supra note 189, at 44–45 (quoting in this context Immanuel
Kant’s dictum from Critique of Pure Reason, “we see things not as they are but as we are”).
191. In noticing the early judges’ inability to articulate a concept, one might
compare them not only to children but also to adults who truly lack linguistic ability,
i.e. aphasics. In retrospect, it is wonderfully sensible that Roman Jakobson examined
metonymy and metaphor in the context of aphasia. See supra note 131. After all, any
person who lacks adequately precise literal language will naturally resort to
approximations such as metonymy and metaphor; cf. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David
Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong: Metaphor and Metonymy
in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2515 (2003) (remarking in a different context that
metonymy “is the attempt to invoke indirectly that which cannot be captured directly,”
and that it is used for describing “parts of the signified, or that which surrounds or
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available vocabulary, namely that of simple physical presence.192 In a
later era, when social developments had made it necessary and feasible,
the International Shoe Court achieved a greater vocabulary. As a historical
matter, then, the hypothesis is strongly inviting: tag jurisdiction has
always been a rhinoceros that early judges called a doggie.
Moreover, this analogy between toddlers and the judges of the past
is supported by the powerful theory known as distributed cognition.
In his landmark book, Cognition in the Wild,193 Edwin Hutchins shows
that organized groups have cognitive properties that are different from
those of the individuals comprising the group. The organization can
be thought of as a single cognizing entity, effectively a form of mind
that is not confined to a single individual’s body.194 Focusing on the
navigation of a large American war ship, Hutchins shows how the labor
of cognition is distributed, both over space (for example, among the

accompanies it, or the traces of its retreat”). For other discussions involving
metonymy, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings
Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1553 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Laconomics of
Apples and Oranges: A Speculative Analysis of the Economic Concept of Commensurability, 15
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 347, 377–80 (2003); Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson,
Law’s Non-Existent Empire, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767, 784–85 (2003).
192. It is not this Article’s business to assert as a matter of historical linguistics that this is
in fact how the concept came to be. Indeed, it would surely be difficult for anyone to ever
unearth proof of the subconscious thought processes of judges who are now long dead. See
generally infra Section III.A. Instead this Article simply suggests that it is a reasonable and even
compelling hypothesis, especially in light of the absence of other justifications.
This same hypothesis helps to shed light on the writ of capias ad respondendum,
discussed supra note 59 and accompanying text. The writ is more a predecessor of
modern service-of-process rules than of modern personal jurisdiction rules. (Indeed,
the fact that the capias writ has now “given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice” helps substantiate the pervasiveness of metaphor and metonymy in law.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added). The modern
device is called a “summons” because, like the writ, it compels the defendant to make an
“appearance” in court, albeit no longer necessarily in a bodily sense. To the judges of
the early era in which the writ was used, making decisions based on their experience and
historical situatedness (including notably the relative absence at that time of welldeveloped alternatives) it would have seemed natural to require a defendant to be bodily
present in court for the purpose of answering the complaint.
For a descriptive perspective on the diachronic aspects of metonymy, not
relying on this Article’s analogy to distributed cognition, see Konieczna & Kleparski,
supra note 189, at 50 and sources cited, describing the need to name new
“technological developments within a particular society.”
193. EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD 175–76 (1995).
194. Distributed cognition can be thought of in terms of the mass/multiplex image
schema, which the author explores in detail in a different context elsewhere. See ColesBjerre, supra note 160, at 373.

52

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

many sailors and other individuals at several stations on the vessel) and
over time (for example, with the individuals taking advantage of
records and tools that were built up by their predecessors over the
years).195 I submit that the development of case law, similarly, is
another paradigmatic example of distributed cognition over time. A
law library is a set of tools (an “external representation,” as Hutchins
says) analogous to the measurements and devices used in navigation,
and the presiding judge in any given case at bar draws on the
accumulated wisdom of his or her past colleagues.196
There is nothing pejorative, then, about analogizing the pre-Pennoyer
judges to toddlers in their use of metonymy: it is simply a fact that the
earlier judges’ work contributes to the outcomes of today’s judges’
cases, but not vice versa.
III. OH NO! IT’S NEITHER LIVE NOR DEAD!
With “dead metonymy” being a metaphor,197 the entailments of that
metaphor suggest that a dead metonymy or dead metonymic expression
must once have been alive.198 And some theorists take this proposition
for granted.199 But the metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS presents
a troublesome case for testing the proposition, and therein lies much of

195. “In an external representation, structure can be built up gradually—a
distribution of cognitive effort over time—so that the final product may be something
that no individual could represent all at once internally.” HUTCHINS, supra note 193,
at 96. For example, the chart that a navigator uses is a product of “more observations
than any one person could make in a lifetime” and “is an artifact that embodies
generations of experience and measurement.” Id. at 111.
196. Others have written about other aspects of law as distributed cognition, for
example the trial process:
Take a court of law. Its purpose is explicitly cognitive: to determine, beyond
reasonable doubt, the truth-value of certain propositions (X is guilty of crime
C). To do so, a number of individuals have specific roles to play, each of them
cognitive . . . . The system is so built that, when everything works well (which is
not always the case), none of the beliefs of the individuals involved determines the
outcome. The decision process is, in some sense, supra-individual. As a
cognitive process, evaluating the truth of the propositions is a system-level affair.
Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne, A Framework for Thinking About Distributed
Cognition, 14 PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 215, 215–16 (2006).
197. See Langacker, Active Zones, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of the aliveness or deadness of metaphorical and metonymic
expressions, see supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text.
199. E.g., DAN FASS, PROCESSING METONYMY AND METAPHOR 49 (1997) (“Dead
metaphors and metonymies were formerly alive, but their meanings have become
frozen or fossilized in word senses and phrases.”).
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its value for legal as opposed to linguistic analysis. This Part of the
Article suggests that the metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is neither
live nor dead, but rather, a disturbing and poorly understood middle
ground between live and dead. The metonymy lurches undead through
the law, leaving destruction in its path, like a zombie.
A. The Undead Among Us
One very standard type of argument used by lawyers and legal
academics is based on the intentions of those who formulated a rule.
For example, statutory interpretation depends heavily on the intent of
the legislature; contractual interpretation depends heavily on the
intent of the parties; and the original intent of the framers is a robust
school of constitutional interpretation as well.200 So, it is perhaps not
surprising that when first hearing this Article’s hypothesis that the
service-while-present rule was a primitive metonymy for minimum
contacts, some lawyers and legal academics have responded
“Interesting—is that what the cases say?”
This response is
disappointing because, as careful readers will already realize, it misses
the fundamental point of this Article’s hypothesis that the formulation
of the service-while-present rule was subconscious. Judges reached for
the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction as a subconscious
substitution for the much more abstract (and, at the time, difficult to
conceptualize) criterion of the defendant having minimum contacts
with the jurisdiction. If those early judges had shared the historical
vantage point of the International Shoe Court and later judges, and had,
therefore, been able to conceptualize the minimum contacts rule in
literal terms, they would have done so.
Thus, one naturally searches in vain for nineteenth century judicial
pronouncements about a defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction
being more or less equivalent to the defendant having sufficient
contacts therewith. To imagine judges of the pre-Pennoyer era explicitly
ruminating about the comparability of presence and contacts is just as
absurd as imagining a coffee shop server consciously planning to refer
to the ham sandwich rather than the customer.201 Such a judicial
opinion would have to say, for example, “This court is presented with
a non-domiciliary defendant who was served while present within this
state’s borders and who, unsurprisingly in light of the non-transitory
200. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 284 (1989).
201. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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nature of that presence in the current era of history, has had
substantial contacts with this state related to the cause of action. But,
it would be tedious and relatively difficult to articulate the details of
those contacts, and hence, for convenience in the remainder of this
opinion, we shall simply refer to the defendant as having been
‘present’.”202 This Article is not based on any such explicit statements
gleaned from case-crunching. Whether PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS had
an initial “conscious” stage is not this Article’s concern,203 though by
now it should be clear to the reader that the cognitive theory at work
here would strongly suggest a negative answer. The pre-Pennoyer judges
would not have been conscious of their thoughts along these lines any
more than the coffee-shop server above, or the toddler doing his or
her best to label the rhinoceros.204
But the fact that PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS was always subconscious
does not mean that it was never “live,” or even that it is now “dead.” If
this Article’s hypothesis is correct, then the metonymy was certainly
and obviously live at the time that the pre-Pennoyer judges developed
the service-while-present rule. (As just explored, scholars of the present
era cannot know directly what was in the early judges’ minds, but it is vastly
more natural to suppose that when those judges referred to presence, it
was a clumsy early attempt at naming something more flexible, rather
than a consciously wooden selection of a criterion that is hard to justify on
its own terms.) Moreover, the metonymy is not “dead” now, in the sense
of being conventionalized; that is, no one would argue that the linkage
of presence and contacts has become a standardized extension of the

202. And a concurrence to such an opinion might run like this: “Though I join my
learned brethren in thinking that the reference to presence is a useful simplification
in the case at hand, I am concerned that the mechanistic application of such a
formulation to future cases, in which a defendant’s presence might be much more
transitory because of as-yet uninvented advances in transportation, would create
problematic assertions of power.”
203. Historians of linguistics or of jurisprudence who want to pursue this line of inquiry
might want to look into the works of Ulrich Huber and their antecedents, among other
sources. See, e.g., James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction
in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990). The answer is probably that this
metonymy never was conscious, and if such is the case, it supports this Article’s thesis.
204. Cf. Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Ipso Facto: The Pattern of Assumable Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 40 N.M. L. REV. 77, 117–18 (2010) (establishing the subconscious nature
of judicial categorization related to ipso facto clauses); Coles-Bjerre, supra note 160, at
373–76 (critiquing judicial policy-making that, while purportedly relying on plain
meaning, is subconsciously motivated by policy preference).
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literal meaning of “present” or any other related word.205 (In today’s
usages such as “I’m there for you,”206 the metonymy is live although
unconscious.)
Even so, the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy does have a dead
aspect, in that its effect today—notably in Burnham and similar tag
jurisdiction cases—is fixed, or frozen, or conventionalized in the
service-while-present rule. In other words, the rule itself is fixed and
conventionalized, even if the underlying metonymy that gave birth to
the rule is not. As explored next, this is a disturbing—some would say
horrifying—middle ground between life and death.
B. The Destructive Effects of an Undead Rule
Although live and dead metonymies impede ordinary human
communication only to an extent that is virtually unnoticeable,207 the
result can be very different when a live metonymy cloaks itself in a halfdead and decaying rule of law. The PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS
metonymy, in particular, morphs into Burnham’s tag jurisdiction rule,
which wreaks destruction on innocent defendants.208
In jurisprudence we have long been aware of the dangerous
potential of metaphor. Cardozo famously wrote, “Metaphors in law are
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it.”209 And the great Realist legal philosopher
Felix Cohen wrote:

205. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (explaining dead metonymy
in terms of conventionalization).
206. See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text (discussing PRESENCE FOR
CONTACTS metonymic expression in everyday non-legal discourse).
207. One of Section II.A’s underlying premises was that people are so good at
understanding metonymic communication in ordinary conversation and other non-legal
discourse. In fact, one test that has been used to explore both metaphor and metonymy
is to measure the reaction time of the hearer or reader, but even when the metaphor or
metonymy does cause a reaction time, it is measured in milliseconds. See Steven Frisson
& Martin J. Pickering, The Processing of Metonymy: Evidence from Eye Movements, 25 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1366, 1366 (1999).
208. The Author has elsewhere also highlighted the unusual degree to which
otherwise purely linguistic concerns can take on great practical importance in the
judicial process. See Coles-Bjerre, supra note 160, at 327–28 (noting that the
interpretation of an ambiguous expression as referring to a whole or to a part causes
little problem “in daily life,” but “in law, and in the judicial process in particular,
concerns of systemic legitimacy, transparency and soundness of reasoning demand
that the subconscious choices be recognized and articulated”).
209. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence
are thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or
mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached on other
grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or
argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and
the social ideals by which the law is to be judged.210

These same pernicious effects can flow from metonymy rather than
metaphor—and PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS, as used in Scalia’s Burnham
concurrence, is a prime example. In keeping with Cohen, we have
already seen how metonymy, like metaphor, is indeed a “poetical or
mnemonic device” but also, and much more powerfully, a
subconscious vehicle for thought. And the central doctrinal point
about Burnham is that the service-while-present rule, though seemingly
unproblematic during the historical era in which it was formulated,
should not have been woodenly extended when later “social forces” led
to the phenomenon of tag jurisdiction.
In American law we are not accustomed to simply taking for granted
conclusions that were reached a hundred years ago. And in particular, if
a century-old conclusion was initially reached by means of metaphor or
metonymy, we in the present age should re-examine whether the
mapping or contiguity that led to it remains persuasive. To close the
books on a metaphor or metonymy and treat it as literal, is to put out of
bounds for today’s reconsideration the legitimacy of the imaginative
choices that were made long ago. Yesterday’s creativity becomes today’s
shackle. The rule’s reasoning is dead, yet the rule itself lives—the horror!
Professors Lakoff and Turner discuss a particular metonymy that
helps to further illuminate the harm that can flow from metonymy in
the context of legal rules:
There is a general metonymy that words stand for the concepts they
express . . . . In a sentence like “Those are foolish words,” the words
are taken as referring, via metonymy, to the concept expressed by
the words, which are being called foolish. [ . . . ] When the
distinction between the words and their conceptual content is clear,
there is no harm in using this metonymy . . . [but] confusion arises
when the metonymy goes unnoticed and no distinction is made
between the words in themselves and concepts they express.211

210. Cohen, supra note 57, at 812.
211. LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 108; see also Radden & Kövecses, supra
note 5, at 42, 46 (stating that words for the concepts they express is a subcase of the
metonymic salience of the concrete over the abstract).
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Lakoff and Turner’s immediate point here is twofold. First, that
metaphorical expressions, which are linguistic, are different from
metaphors, which are conceptual.212 And second, that non-experts
often use the term “metaphor” to refer, metonymically, to
metaphorical expressions.213 But this same point also has a much
broader resonance for purposes of this Article. In law, the result of
failing to keep in mind a metonymy is not only “confusion” (though
that is part of the problem) but, more to the point, bad law—like an
improper assertion of judicial power.214
The great novelist William Faulkner famously said, “The past is never
dead. It’s not even past.”215 When a metonymy generates a legal rule,
and then judges apply that legal rule literally, even when the reasons for
the original metonymy have weakened, the result is not a dead
metonymy but a zombie metonymy. It is as if the judges’ brains have
been partially devoured.
The zombie-like nature of American law under Burnham is
highlighted by contrasting it with ongoing international negotiations

212. See supra note 128 (discussing this distinction).
213. Hence, in Lakoff and Turner’s formulation as just quoted, “words” such as
metaphor, when used by non-experts, metonymically stand for “the concept[]” of
metaphor as understood by linguists.
214. The field of Zombie Legal Studies is new, but it is lurching relentlessly along.
See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Zev J. Eigen, Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction: The Unread and the Undead, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 65 (2017); Andrea Clark,
Amidst the Walking Dead: Judicial and Nonjudicial Approaches for Eradicating Zombie
Mortgages, 65 EMORY L.J. 795 (2016); Sutton James Smith, Zombie Powers of Attorney: The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 and the Undead Power of Attorney for Health Care, 39 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 285 (2014); Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1119 (2015); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44
N.M. L. REV. 327 (2014); Adam P. Segal, Zombie Copyrights: Copyright Restoration under
the New 104A of the Copyright Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71
(1997); see also Stempel, supra note 99, at 1255 (remarking at the end of the article that
tag jurisdiction survives “[l]ike something from a bad zombie movie”); Kickstarter
Campaign for Zombie Law:
Zombies in the Federal Courts, a casebook,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/888628681/zombie-law-zombies-in-the-federal
-courts-a-caseboo (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (raising funds for a legal casebook collecting
federal court cases using the word zombie). Zombielaw, www.zombielaw.wordpress.com
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (blogging on “zombies in law, politics and current events”).
Most of the Zombie Legal Studies publications to date have focused briefly on
various once-dead, now-live aspects of their subject matter, without probing into the halfdead aspects of the related judicial reasoning, linguistic or otherwise. Leib & Eigen, above,
is an exception and builds nicely on Grant Gilmore’s famous pronouncement about the
“death of contract.” See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995).
215. WILLIAM F. FAULKNER & RUTH FORD, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, act 1, sc. 3, at 33 (1950).
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being conducted under the auspices of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law.216 These negotiations are part of what has
proven to be a very lengthy multilateral project to draft a Convention217
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments internationally218—
and tag jurisdiction is conspicuously absent from the current draft
Convention.219 Kevin Clermont, a leader in the field of courts’
216. The Hague Conference has eighty-two nation members, from Albania to
Zambia, plus the European Union which belongs to the conference as a Regional
Economic Integration Organization. See HCCH Members, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT’L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members (last visited Oct.
17, 2018). It first met in 1893 on the initiative of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tobias
Michel Karel Asser, and became a permanent inter-governmental organization in
1955. See A World Organisation . . . , HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, . . . . . .
https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
217. A convention is a multilateral agreement among nations. See Convention,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (10th ed. 2014).
218. See The Permanent Bureau, Continuation of the Judgments Project, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 3 (Feb. 2010) https://assets.hcch.net/docs/cd5f7
9f4-d710-44a1-a266-af0e73a6ffb4.pdf (discussing “the variety of jurisdictional practices
and approaches to [international] recognition and enforcement” to facilitate crossborder effects of judgments).
219. See Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
February 2017 Draft Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 1, 3–5 (Feb.
2017) [hereinafter February 2017 Draft], https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-04274a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.pdf (setting forth the proposed “[b]ases for recognition and
enforcement” of a judgment, Article 5 of the draft Convention omits any reference to
service while the defendant is present in the jurisdiction).
More pointedly, earlier drafts of the Convention affirmatively abjured tag
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 9–
10 (Oct. 30, 1999), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf (prohibiting
jurisdiction based on “the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State”); Russell
J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What
Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 167, 189–90 (1998) (noting that
“[the United States] will have to agree to black list tag jurisdiction if we want a
convention”). In the February 2017 Draft, the point is made only obliquely. See
February 2017 Draft at 6 (providing that a State, i.e. a nation adhering to the
Convention, may refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment if it “would be
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including
situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible
with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State”). Cf. Russell J.
Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments Convention, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 1269, 1270, 1278 (1998) (noting that tag jurisdiction is blacklisted under the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted as amended in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (1990)). Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations notes
that in international litigation, “jurisdiction based on service of process on a person
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territorial powers, notes that European nations regard transient
presence as “too thin” a basis for asserting “any and all causes of
action,” and opines that “[t]he Europeans are right on that point.”220
Unfortunately, the prospects for an end to tag jurisdiction as a
matter of U.S. law appear far from bright, based at least on the
jurisprudence of Neil Gorsuch—Justice Scalia’s direct replacement on
the bench.221 Two examples will have to suffice here. First, now-Justice
Gorsuch’s dissent in the infamous “frozen trucker” case (penned while
he was still on the Tenth Circuit),222 is emblematic of his rejection
rather than embrace of factors like intention, purpose, and social
context in the judicial process. Briefly, Alphonse Maddin was a truck
driver who was stuck for hours in sub-zero January weather with frozen
brakes.223 Numb and in fear of personal harm or death, Mr. Maddin
unhitched the truck cab from the trailer, and drove briefly to a safe
warming spot—contrary to his employer’s orders.224 The employer
fired him for taking these precautions.225 A majority of the Tenth
Circuit’s panel ruled that the firing was wrongful because federal law
bars an employer from firing an employee who “refuses to operate a
vehicle because . . . the employee has a reasonable apprehension of
serious injury.”226 Then-Judge Gorsuch dissented because the statute
protects only “refus[ing] to operate” a vehicle rather than “operating”
it.227 The statute’s unmistakable purpose is to protect the health and
safety of truckers—and as the facts show, this purpose can be just as

only transitorily in the territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under
international law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 421 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
220. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation, supra note 22, at 96, 111. For further
discussion of the Hague Judgment project, see Justyna Regan, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—A Second Attempt in The Hague?, 14 RICH. J. GLOBAL L.
& BUS. 63, 64, 82–86 (2015); Consultation Paper on the 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, INT’L LAW DIV. HONG KONG DEP’T
OF JUSTICE 1, 5–11 (Oct. 2016), http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/
2016/consultation_ild.pdf.
221. In addition to the replacement of Scalia by Gorsuch, the other eight Burnham
Justices have also been replaced.
222. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206, 1215–17 (10th
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1208 (Murphy, J.).
224. Id. at 1208–09.
225. Id. at 1209.
226. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis omitted).
227. TransAm, 833 F.3d at 1215–16 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

60

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

strongly implicated by operating as by not operating—but Judge
Gorsuch refused to take account of the legislative purpose.228
Our other convenient example is Justice Gorsuch’s first opinion as a
Supreme Court Justice, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.229 At
issue was the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),230
which protects consumers from threats, family harassment, abusive
midnight phone calls, etc. on the part of a debt collector.231 But the
statutory definition of “debt collector”232 is interesting. It clearly
includes an independent company hired by an auto dealer to collect
what the consumer owes the auto dealer; and conversely, the term
clearly excludes the auto dealer itself, collecting what the consumer
owes to it.233 The statutory distinction is whether the debt is “owed or
due . . . another,”234 and the congressionally declared purpose behind
this distinction is that the auto dealer itself is usually “restrained by the
desire to protect [its] good will when collecting past due accounts,”
while independent companies are likely to have “no future contact
with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer’s
opinion of them.”235 Santander involved a middle ground: the consumer
sought protection from a professional debt buyer that had acquired the
debt from the auto dealer (instead of being hired by the auto dealer)
trying to collect for itself (not for the auto dealer).236

228. “Even supposing all this is true, though, when the statute is plain it simply isn’t
our business to appeal to legislative intentions.” Id. at 1217. For an incredulous and
devastating mockery of then-Judge Gorsuch’s reasoning by then-Senator Al Franken
during the confirmation hearings, see Paul Callan, Judge Gorsuch and the frozen truck
driver, CNN (March 21, 2017, 5:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/21/
opinions/judge-gorsuch-the-frozen-truck-driver-opinion-callan. For more on the
case’s role in the confirmation hearings, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Neil Gorsuch
and the “Frozen Trucker,” SLATE (March 21, 2017, 10:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/neil_gorsuch_s_arrogant_frozen
_trucker_opinion_shows_he_wants_to_be_like.html.
229. 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017).
230. Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2012)).
231. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1720.
232. See § 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts . . . owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (emphasis added)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. F.T.C. v. Check Inv’rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696–97).
236. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1720–21.
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From the point of view of the consumer, the debt buyer is just like
an independent company hired by an auto dealer: no prior
relationship, no likelihood of a future relationship, and thus
“unconcerned with the consumer’s opinion of them.”237 But Justice
Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous Court, relied almost solely on
grammatical reasoning (notably, is the debt, originated by the auto
dealer but now owned by the debt buyer, “owed or due . . . another”?),
to find that the statute did not protect the consumer against the debt
buyer.238 Thus, he ignored not only congressional purpose, but also
the changing social landscape. The FDCPA was enacted in 1977, at a
time when there was not much of a professional debt buying
industry.239 In the forty intervening years, the professional debt buying
industry has exploded, accompanied by abuses that Congress—like the
pre-Pennoyer judges—lacked the experience or vocabulary to articulate.
The unpromising nature of the current Supreme Court’s outlook in no
way diminishes the importance of this Article’s critique. On the contrary,
the prospect of a continuing conservative bench should make lawyers and
others scrutinize the Court’s reasoning all the more carefully. Plain
meaning, strict construction, and the unreflective perpetuation of zombie
metonymies are all forms of a judicial hands-off-ism that, as has been
explained in this Section III.B, fails to do real justice.
C. Others Manage, So What Was Justice Scalia’s Excuse?
The phenomenon of a metonymy being invented in one era and
then ceasing to be appropriate with the passage of time is not unique
to tag jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, civil procedure, or law. But
in the other contexts, language users have adapted by moving past the
metonymy or by at least marginalizing the metonymy. This fact makes
the Scalia opinion in Burnham even more regrettable.
In law, one very instructive example of flexibility in other bodies of
law is the statute of frauds. Already regarded as an “anachronism”
decades ago,240 the statute of frauds has, for centuries, sought to ensure
that only genuine contracts are sued on, by requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate the contract to be in writing and signed by the

237. Check Inv’rs, 502 F.3d at 173.
238. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1722–24.
239. Id. at 1724.
240. See Hugh Evander Willis, The Statute of Frauds—A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J.
427, 429 (1928).
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defendant.241 But as the electronic age arrived, difficulties arose in
applying this writing-plus-signature rule.242 Courts struggled to define
“writing” and “signing” without a physical paper contract. In theory,
our legal system could have continued applying the seventeenthcentury statute of frauds unchanged, but lawmakers have responded
to the practical demands of changing social circumstances by enacting
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),243 which gives legal
effect to acts that are deemed the electronic equivalents of writings and
signatures.244 In retrospect, this modern development has clarified
that the initial impulse behind the statute of frauds was not to value
writings and signatures for their own sake; rather, the initial impulse
was to value writings and signatures as indications of “intent to sign”
the contract.245 When new means of authenticating the contract
became available, the law adjusted to move beyond its initial,
physicalist, formulation. The writing requirement stands revealed as
never having been more than an initial, awkward metonymy (like
“doggie”) for a more abstract concept.
Of course, electronic records and electronic signatures are broader
categories than writings and pen-on-paper signatures, but in
retrospect, our modern experience with electronic signatures reveals
that the old pre-UETA statute of frauds, not the new UETA, was overinclusive. Consider the case of a celebrity who is asked to autograph a
piece of paper, and who does so, but the piece of paper unbeknownst
to the celebrity turns out to be a contract. Counter-intuitively, if the
celebrity’s duplicitous fan sues the celebrity on the contract, the
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 117 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 353, 353–405 (4th ed. 2004).
242. See Alison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, From the Chair: “Click Here to Accept the Terms
of Service,” 31 COMMC’N. LAW. (Jan. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/communications_lawyer/january2015/CL_Win15_v31n1.pdf
(detailing the controversial nature of click-wrap agreements).
243. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
244. The statute’s terminology is “electronic record” and “electronic signature,”
with the latter defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or
logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent
to sign the record.” See UETA § 2(8) (1999). As of this writing, the UETA has been
adopted by forty-seven states, plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
See Legislative Fact Sheet—Electronic Transactions Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions
%20Act (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
245. Electronic
Transactions
Act
Summary,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%2
0Act (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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celebrity will not have a statute of frauds defense, because traditional
statutes of frauds, unlike UETA, have no “intent to sign” element.246
Thus the traditional statutes of frauds were over-inclusive. This is
exactly the same characteristic of the service-while-present rule that
regrettably validates tag jurisdiction.
UETA prevents electronic signatures from being over-inclusive,247
but it does not fix the longstanding over-inclusivity of the statute of
frauds itself because it does not affect the validity of pen-and-paper
signatures. Thus even post-UETA the celebrity in the above example
would still be bound by the contract that he or she unwittingly signed.
This aspect of UETA, too, illuminates a weakness of Justice Scalia’s
Burnham opinion. Rather than invalidating tag jurisdiction using the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Scalia airily invites the states to
achieve a similar effect by narrowing their own long-arm statutes.248
Justice Brennan’s opinion calls this reliance on possible state-level
action “misplaced,” because “[s]tates have little incentive to limit rules
such as transient jurisdiction that make it easier for their own citizens
to sue out-of-state defendants . . . . Out-of-staters do not vote in state
elections or have a voice in state government.”249 The UETA
experience shows how well taken Brennan’s point is. With UETA as
opposed to the long-arm statutes, a thoughtful and effective uniform
statutory drafting process was in place,250 and in addition, any of
UETA’s forty-nine adopting legislatures had the opportunity to tweak
and improve the uniform bill during the state-specific enactment
246. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) (2015) (requiring only that the agreement be
“subscribed” by the party to be charged, without an intent element). Nonetheless the
contract would not be binding, at least in principle, because of general contract law’s
requirement of intent to be bound. But removing the statute of frauds defense means that
no summary judgment will be available to the defendant and could even lead to a wrong
result on the merits, depending on the parties’ credibility and on who can prove what. Cf.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 241, at 390 (noting that the modern test is whether the other party
reasonably believes that the asserted signer had the intent to adopt the writing).
247. See supra note 243 (requiring “intent to sign”).
248. “We have conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness
of the prevailing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are
free to amend it . . . .” Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality
opinion). “Nothing we say today prevents individual States from limiting or entirely
abandoning the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction.” Id. at 627.
249. Id. at 639–40 n.14 (Brennan, J., concurring).
250. See About the ULC, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx
?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (describing the “deliberative
and uniquely open drafting process” that underlies UETA and other Uniform Law
Commission statutes).
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process.251 Yet no state-level action directed against the statute of
frauds’ longstanding over-inclusivity took place.252 As is so often true,
but as Justice Scalia declined to consider, a decision about “forum”
becomes in practice a decision about substance.253
There are many other examples in law. In old English property law,
land was formerly transferred only by livery of seisin—literally the
hand-to-hand passing of soil from the ground in question254—but in
modern times this insistence on physicalism has been abandoned. In
criminal procedure, the remedy of habeas corpus was formerly
available only when a prisoner was in custody of the courts,255 but in
modern times, the law has moved away from this physicalist focus so
that the remedy is also available to persons who are free on probation,
parole, or the like.256 In commercial law, property rights of owners and
secured parties with respect to assets like securities were historically
determined principally by physical possession,257 but over the past
twenty-five years or so this concept has been generalized to permit the
property rights to be determined based on “control,” which while
generally analogous to possession may also be narrower258 or
broader.259 Other examples will doubtless occur to readers in their
own fields of legal expertise.
251. See Patricia Brumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic
Commerce Laws, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?titl
e=UETA%20and%20Preemption%20Article (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing
some of the changes made when states enacted the UETA).
252. Cf. Kenneth Chase, The Statute of Frauds in the Digital Age, LAW 360 (June 27,
2014) (discussing the evolution of the statute of frauds over the past twenty years).
253. No pun intended.
254. See Livery of Seisin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “livery of
seisin” as “[t]he ceremony by which a grantor conveyed land to a grantee” and noting
that it involved “either (1) going on the land and having the grantor symbolically
deliver possession of the land to the grantee by handing over a twig, a clod of dirt, or
a piece of turf (called livery in deed) or (2) going within sight of the land and having
the grantor tell the grantee that possession was being given, followed by the grantee’s
entering the land (called livery in law)”).
255. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
748, 754 (1986). The term habeas corpus literally means “that you have the body.”
Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
256. Chemerinsky, supra note 255, at 754–55.
257. See James Steven Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 38 OHIO ST.
L.J. 197, 202–04 (1987).
258. See, e.g., U.C.C § 8-106(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (imposing conditions in
addition to possession for control of certificated securities in registered form).
259. See generally James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1481 (1996) (“Though the control concept may, at first
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Quite apart from law, metonymies in daily life often become
outdated, and people take this in stride without letting the metonymy
constrain them. Computer files used to be saved on “floppy discs,” and
as a result even today, the “save” button on all of our Word toolbars is
labeled with an icon of a floppy disc, even though that medium has
been completely obsolete for the past several years.260 Similarly,
automobile engines used to make a “vroom” sound when moving down
the road, and when hybrid engines like that of a Toyota Prius became
silent this became dangerous to pedestrians who were no longer
warned by the noise. Accordingly, the option arose for Prius owners
to buy a special, artificial vrooming sound.261 Similar examples could
again be easily multiplied—for example, election campaign billboards
that show a check-mark next to a candidate’s name. The floppy disc icon,
the vrooming Prius, and the check-mark on the election campaign
billboard are all metonymies, and probably even dead metonymies, but
crucially, they do not have zombie effects. This is because these
metonymies are not woodenly adhered to, whether in the law or in any
other coercive medium. For example, no laptop user is confused or limited
by today’s floppy disc icon; on the contrary, if we think about it at all, we see
that the icon is a quaint throwback provided for convenience of reference
only. If only Justice Scalia had had the same insight about presence.262
Metonymy is everywhere, and certainly not just in the law of personal
jurisdiction. Among the myriad metonymies in law and elsewhere, many

examination, seem novel, it is, in fact, fully consistent with basic principles of the law
of secured transactions; indeed, the control concept can usefully be regarded as
merely a generalization from several specific rules that have long been part of the law
of securities and secured transactions . . . .”); WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES: REVISED ARTICLE 8 INVESTMENT SECURITIES § 8-106:4 (2018)
(control by agreement “is, in essence, the indirect holding system analog of a
transaction in which a debtor pledges bearer securities to a lender”). See also U.C.C
§ 9-207(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (rights such as repledge of secured party having
“possession or control”). In terms of its breadth, control, unlike possession, is available
for property that is completely intangible. E.g., id. §§ 8-106(c)–(d), (f) (uncertificated
and indirectly held securities); § 9-104 (bank accounts and commodity accounts).
260. E.g., Obsolescence:
Hardware and Media, DIG. PRES. MGMT.,
http://www.dpworkshop.org/dpm-eng/oldmedia/obsolescence2.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing how the hardware evolution, including USB keys and CD
drives, forces floppy disc based peripherals into obsolescence).
261. Jim Motavalli, Hybrid Cars May Include Fake Vroom for Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/automobiles/14hybrid.html.
262. Recalling children’s use of metonymy in the absence of adult vocabularies and
experience, we can note that Justice Scalia did not have these children’s excuses. See
supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
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become dead, as just discussed. So one can imagine law and indeed all of
civilization being assailed by relentless armies of zombie metonymies—
but collectively we have managed to keep them at bay. Except in Burnham.
CONCLUSION: PRESENCE AS ANOTHER MERE “ANCIENT FORM”
Judges of any era (including our own) are limited by an entirely
natural and human inability to see the future. Accordingly, the cases of
the past must be seen as having been written for their own day, and
should apply to their facts while being potentially subject to change
when new facts arise. The modern common-law method is well adapted
to this reality. But Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion behaves in a wooden
way that ignores these basic aspects of judging. The argument here is
that Justice Scalia made a cognitive error, by accepting at face value the
once-legitimate metonymy of an earlier era and by doggedly clinging to
it despite enormous changes in the circumstances that animated the
metonymy in the first place. Part II.A showed that metonymy is largely
about cognitive convenience and, on the jurisprudential level, Justice
Scalia’s emphasis on a defendant’s simple physical presence when
served is certainly convenient for judges. It saves them all of the
analytical work that would be required in assessing the factual fabric of
the situation, if International Shoe’s standard-like approach were to be
required.263 In this way, the Burnham opinion is consistent with many of
the other opinions that Justice Scalia has left us.264
By calling into question what the pre-Pennoyer judges really would have
meant by presence, if the judges had had the experience and vocabulary
of our later age, this Article hoists Justice Scalia on his own originalist
petard. Originalists look at the law at an earlier point in time and accept
it as having a fixed meaning that should control today, as Justice Scalia
does in Burnham, with his asserted understanding of personal

263. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
264. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 15–28 (2012) (discussing the contrast between textualism
and opposing schools of judicial thought); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2000) (criticizing Scalia’s
understanding of the Constitution as having a single, ascertainable meaning); Megan
McDermott, Justice Scalia’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence: The Right Judicial Philosophy for the Modern
Bankruptcy Code?, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 939, 939 (2017) (explaining that Scalia’s bankruptcy
decisions reflect a uniform judicial philosophy); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of
Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1992) (noting
that Scalia consistently applied a “text-and-rule-based approach” to statutory interpretation
rather than “traditional case by case common law judging”).
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jurisdiction at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this Article
probes even further into the past, seeking to excavate beneath the
originalists’ temporal stopping points, in order to reveal how those
points, themselves, came to be. One could puckishly call this technique
“original intent.” The goal here is far from accepting any prior
understanding as being authoritative; rather the goal is to expose the
thinking processes that shaped those prior understandings, the better
to evaluate whether we wish to accept that prior, subconscious, thinking
today. There is no reason to think that the pre-Pennoyer judges were
more self-conscious or free from subconscious imaginative forms of
reasoning than all of us are today; and if those early judges’ focus on
presence was really just a metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS, then
today’s judges’ perpetuation of that metonymy despite the changed
social circumstances is nothing more or less than zombie jurisprudence.
Today’s judges can and often do reject longstanding precedents; they
can and often do rule longstanding statutes to be unenforceable; and
similarly, they can, and should, be open to changing our acceptance of
metaphors or metonymies from long ago.265
The Shaffer Court brought International Shoe’s minimum contacts standard
to bear on in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction chiefly by recognizing that
distinguishing those bases from in personam jurisdiction was an “ancient

265. To the extent the unpacking of “presence” to reveal a looser conception of
contacts is political at all, it tends to be liberal rather than conservative, because it
leaves open to today’s judges the possibility of protecting relatively weak defendants
against “outer limits” of tag jurisdiction that may be even broader than the Brennan
opinion suspects. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. By the same token
(and fitting well with the above notion of “original intent”), original intent itself is no
longer just a tool for conservative argumentation. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY
(2012) (suggesting that the Constitution invites recourse beyond its text and the
results can support outcomes like the outlawing of racial segregation and the
upholding of abortion rights); SCOTT GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 194 (1995)
(using John Locke’s influence on the Framers to conclude, for example, that “there is
a constitutional right to basic education, health care, food, housing, and clothing”);
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007)
(defending Roe v. Wade with an originalist methodology); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 240 (2009) (demonstrating the variety of
stances among originalists and suggesting that originalism is more a rhetorical code
than a political commitment); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:
Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1997)
(propounding a “semantic originalism” that is independent of the framers’ concrete
and context-dependent expectations).
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form without substantial modern justification.”266 By exactly the same token,
this Article’s exploration of the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy shows
that the service-while-present rule is also a mere “ancient form without
substantial modern justification.”267 The service-while-present rule is
“ancient” because adopted by the pre-Pennoyer judges. It is a “form” because
it is based on a superficial linguistic articulation, that is, a dead metonymy,
perpetuated in Burnham as a zombie metonymy. And it is “without
substantial modern justification” because the enormous changes in social
conditions between the mid-nineteenth century and modern times have
enabled mere transient presence to be dissociated from substantive contacts.268
Earlier in his compelling essay from which this Article’s epigraph is
taken, Nietzsche asks us to question whether linguistic conventions are
“really the products of knowledge.”269 He asks pointedly, “Do the
designations and the things coincide?”270 The presence for contacts
metonymy explored in this Article is a powerful case study that
highlights and elaborates on Nietzsche’s doubts. In fact, looking back
at the epigraph, with deeper appreciation now, Nietzsche’s contention
that “truth” is really just a “mobile army of . . . metonyms” that “after
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory”271 can sometimes apply
with devastating force to rules of law. Legal rules are linguistic
constructs developed by judges and other human beings; the rules don’t
fall from the sky. To be sure, the service-while-present rule has a long
and honorable history; unfortunately, this rule, “after long use,” also
came to “seem firm, canonical and obligatory” to the late Justice Scalia.
His Burnham opinion animates the rule with an artificially prolonged
half-life as if the rule did, in fact, fall from the sky. The time has long
passed for the rule, and Justice Scalia’s zombie reasoning, to be replaced
by a later, more mature, linguistic construct. The tide of history—with
its changing “sum of human relations”272—demands it.
266. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
267. Id.
268. Justice Scalia had argued that his opinion in Burnham was consistent with
Shaffer because the scope of Shaffer’s concluding sentence (that “all assertions” of statecourt jurisdiction must be limited by International Shoe) was limited to its immediately
preceding paragraph (regarding in rem proceedings). See supra note 99. But by
recognizing that presence in the jurisdiction is itself just an “ancient form,” this Article
shows that even if one adopts Scalia’s asserted limitation of Shaffer’s conclusion, his
opinion is still inconsistent with Shaffer.
269. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 45.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 46–47.
272. Id.

